Tool-using AI agents change files, databases, access rights and public information, yet permission to call a tool does not establish whether a mistake can be undone. We present Reversibility Classes, a declared five-level vocabulary with argument-sensitive rules, conservative defaults and an explicit prior-state capture contract. The pinned implementation and evidence-linked registry cover 536 tools across 20 MCP servers. All 738 rule-case checks conform to declared expectations, while native annotation mapping differs from draft registry labels for 118 of 481 comparable tools. One AI-assisted reviewer approves 148 ratings, 75 matching the registry; this is not independent agreement. On 2,158 recorded runs, the implemented session guard gates the associated action in all 29 attributable attack-positive runs, compared with 18 for a read/write proxy, while adding nine approval points across 1,209 benign runs. Controlled file, Git, SQLite and three-browser experiments show that recovery depends on captured state, later changes, editor storage and recovery route, and expose a Git merge-state exception. The evidence supports making recovery assumptions explicit and testable. It does not establish registry-wide accuracy, reduced production harm or general recovery reliability.
Figures & tables
Figure 2: Native hints lose distinctions expressed by the registry. (A) Base-label composition of 536 draft registry entries. (B) Annotation mapping for 481 comparable tools, with raw counts in each cell. The outlined R2 column is empty by construction. The 55 unmatched tools are excluded from the matrix. Disagreement with draft labels is not an accuracy estimate; full counts are in Table A3 .
Figure 3: A measured replay tradeoff, with separate denominators. The implemented session guard covers 29 associated actions versus 18 for the read/write proxy, at 1,904 versus 1,895 benign approval points. All 11 additional covered cases depend on web-exposure modeling. Bars start at zero. The selected 29-run attribution subset and 1,209 benign runs are not intervention outcomes; all seven policy arms appear in Table A4 .
Figure 4: Restoring the starting state can destroy later work. The schematic corresponds to the separate-paragraph fixture, repeated across four encoding/line-ending variants. Whole-file rollback erases the later change; a three-way merge preserves it; a conservative guard defers. The classifier supplies the capture contract, while the harness supplies all recovery algorithms. All scenarios, including unavailable capture, appear in Table A5 .
Figure 5: An exception to an unconditional Git restoration claim. For both pending-merge fixtures, the documented soft reset restores the measured branch tip, index and files but not the pending-merge markers. This qualifies the draft R1 label for this recovery route; it does not prove that every alternative recovery procedure fails. Full state records and scenario outcomes accompany Tables A6 and A13 .
Figure 6: Recoverability depends on editor storage and recovery route. Each cell represents two synthetic drafts, each repeated once. Exact means the final text returns; Earlier means only the first edit returns; Empty means no text returns through the tested route. Browser builds, profiles and automation methods differ, so the comparison is not an isolated engine effect. Restart results and unmeasured Safari conditions are explicit in Table A8 .
Artificial intelligence agent security studies attacks and safeguards for tool-using, persistent, and collaborative systems across digital and physical settings.