cs.CLNov 17, 2026

From Imperfective Paradox to Moorean Absurdity: Single-Chain Reasoning Lock-In and Multi-Candidate Verbalization Across Aspectual and Pragmatic Ambiguity

Authors: An-Sheng Jhang

Organizations: Dongguan University of Technology

Abstract

Natural language entailment and coherence judgments often depend on whether an event merely occurred, reached a telic culmination, satisfied a plan, or was evaluated under multiple pragmatic standards. We test observable consequences of the single-chain premature lock-in hypothesis across four preregistered, sealed formal experiments on Qwen3-8B-Q8_0 (16,640 formal units, temperature=0.0): 15 of 16 hypothesis slots retain confirmatory status (12 rejecting H0 under within-experiment Holm control at alpha_fam=0.05; E3_H3 demoted to descriptive status). In Experiment 1, Direct-CoT vs. MCU differs by 25.00 pp on telic high-confidence completion (Holm p=1.31239e-05), while NLI-CoT collapses by -91.25 pp on uninterrupted atelic items (Holm p=1.81805e-21). Multi-Candidate Verbalization (MCV) elicits K=5 weighted estimates in one call, separating the prompt from unweighted (MCU) and self-weighted (MCW) readouts. Mandarin (E2) and English (E3) expose an Interruption-Anchored Realis Paradox under NLI-CoT. In Experiment 4, MCU-CF raises perceived coherence on implicit Moorean sentences by 26.64 pp over Direct-CoT (Holm p=0.0006), alongside Direct-CF - Direct-CoT = 29.15 pp and MCU-CoT - Direct-CoT = 17.31 pp. A 1,800-call OpenAI ablation and a stage="dev" P16.7 cross-model extension (4,240 planned/collected units across five external models: 4,222 valid, 18 format-missing, 0 transport-missing; <2% missing per slice; OpenAI gpt-4o-mini at top_logprobs=20 achieves 1,000/1,000 valid units) show that discrete NLI-CoT and scalar Direct-CoT judgments dissociate across models. Confirmatory effects concern observable prompt-and-readout protocols; internal premature lock-in remains a hypothesis. All code, stimuli, preregistered analysis plans, and verification tools are available at https://github.com/asj252/llm-judgment-studies.

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