cs.LGNov 17, 2026

Virtual Double Oracle: Faster Convergence by Leveraging Strategies That Were Watching All Along

Authors: Ruilan Wang, Francisco Aristi Reina, Katerina Papadaki

Organizations: Department of Mathematics, London School of Economics, London, UK

Abstract

Double Oracle (DO) and PSRO approximate Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games by iteratively expanding a strategy population with best responses supplied by an oracle. Online Double Oracle (ODO) interleaves multiplicative weights updates (MWU) with population discovery and obtains an O(kln⁡k/T)O(\sqrt{k\ln k/T}) rate, where TT is the number of learning rounds and kk is the larger of the two players' final population sizes. We identify the reinitialisation step as an underexplored design choice: at each expansion, MWU-based methods reset newly discovered strategies to a uniform prior. We introduce Virtual Double Oracle (VDO), which exploits a bilinear identity (a strategy's full hindsight loss history collapses to its utility against the time-averaged opponent) to initialise each new strategy with the MWU weight it would have had from the start. We prove that VDO achieves O(k/T)O(\sqrt{k/T}) exploitability over the discovered population as it grows, provided the cumulative cost of adding strategies is at most linear in kk, a condition supported by our empirical measurements. Discounted VDO (dVDO) moderates historical preferences to reduce over-concentration at reinitialisation. Experiments across matrix games, poker, and Goofspiel show that, with a suitable discount, dVDO can substantially reduce finite-horizon exploitability relative to both VDO and uniform-reset ODO, and can improve the discovered strategy populations.

Figures & tables

Appendix figures & tables13 assets

Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.

Appendix

Explore similar work

CardsList
  1. Global Policy-Space Response Oracles for Two-Player Zero-Sum Games

    May 27, 2026Junyu Zhang, Feihong Yang, Jian Wang +2Nash EquilibriumGame Theory

  2. When and Why is Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Slow? The Geometry of Energy Dissipation

    May 13, 2026John Lazarsfeld, Anas Barakat, Georgios Piliouras +2Nash EquilibriumLast-Iterate Convergence

  3. Offline Two-Player Zero-Sum Markov Games with KL Regularization

    May 13, 2026Claire Chen, Yuheng Zhang, Xinyu Liu +3Nash Equilibrium ComputationReinforcement Learning