cs.HCNov 18, 2026

Negotiating Control and Accountability among Stakeholders in High-Risk AI Use Cases: Development and Evaluation of the Method ALIGN

Authors: Lena Schneider, Daniel Boos, Gudela Grote

Organizations: ETH Zurich, Department of Management, Technology, and Economics, Switzerland · Swiss Federal Railways, Switzerland

Abstract

Characteristics of Artificial Intelligence (AI) severely restrict human control. This creates new challenges for socio-technical systems design especially in safety-critical domains, where control over risks is essential along with the accountability for any harm caused. Drawing from human factors and AI governance literature, expert interviews and participant observation in a complex high-risk AI use case from the railways, we developed ALIGN, a scenario-based method that supports the governance of and stakeholder involvement in AI development and implementation in three ways: raising awareness for potential accountability-control misalignments in socio-technical systems and their negative consequences, offering a structured approach to assessing the alignment between accountability and control for stakeholders in a given use case, and supporting effective design decisions to mitigate AI risks. We describe the iterative development and evaluation of ALIGN and discuss how this method promotes AI governance by highlighting the relevance of control-accountability alignment throughout the AI life cycle.

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