cs.MANov 18, 2026

Kaer: Security-Aware Replanning for Multi-Agent Systems

Authors: Tushin Mallick, Evan Rose, Matthew Laws, Alina Oprea, Cristina Nita-Rotaru

Organizations: Northeastern University

Abstract

One popular architecture for multi-agent systems (MAS) relies on an orchestrator that generates an initial plan, coordinates its execution, and dynamically revises the plan based on agent feedback when tasks cannot be fully specified in advance. This dynamic replanning introduces a critical vulnerability: malicious agents can embed instructions within their feedback to hijack the replanning process. Existing defenses focus exclusively on per-tool access control or static, pre-execution policy enforcement, leaving the replanning phase unsecured. We introduce Kaer, a multi-agent framework featuring security-aware replanning. Kaer shields the planner from untrusted agent feedback by conveying diagnostics to the replanning procedure strictly through abstract templates. Plan revisions are restricted to a set of deterministic repair operators, and all modified plans must satisfy preset policies. We create Cintra, a benchmark of simulated user tasks requiring replanning paired with adversarial objectives targeting the replanning phase. Using Cintra, we evaluate both task completion rates and system vulnerability to replanning exploits by malicious agents. Evaluating Kaer on Cintra against Magentic-One (an undefended MAS) and ControlValve (the state-of-the-art defense) demonstrates that Kaer achieves higher robustness than both systems while maintaining comparable utility to ControlValve. Although abstract failure templates slightly constrain utility on select tasks, Kaer enables MAS to perform secure, dynamic plan revisions without exposing the orchestrator to untrusted agent feedback.

Figures & tables

Explore similar work

Nov 13, 2026

Securing Multi-Agent Systems by Design

Multi-agent systems solve complex tasks by decomposing them into subtasks, delegating the subtasks to agents, and aggregating the agents' responses using an aggregation rule. Malicious agents can manipulate the final solution by providing malicious responses to their assigned subtasks. In this paper, we first propose response manipulation attacks (ReMA), which iteratively optimize malicious responses to maximize attack effectiveness. Specifically, we formulate untargeted and targeted attacks as optimization problems and develop an approach to approximately solve these problems by iteratively refining malicious responses based on feedback from a surrogate multi-agent system. To defend against such attacks, we further propose SecMAS, a secure aggregation rule that leverages the semantic similarities among agent responses to select the response that is most consistent with a sufficiently large subset of the other responses. We theoretically establish security guarantees for SecMAS against both untargeted and targeted attacks. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that existing aggregation rules are vulnerable to ReMA, whereas SecMAS effectively defends against all evaluated attacks, including adaptive variants of ReMA, while maintaining utility comparable to that of existing aggregation rules.
Apr 25, 2026

Architecture Matters for Multi-Agent Security

Multi-agent systems (MAS), composed of networks of two or more autonomous AI agents, have become increasingly popular in production deployments, yet introduce security risks that do not arise in single-agent settings. Even if individual agents exhibit robust security, architectural decisions governing their coordination can create attack surfaces that have not been systematically characterized. In this work, we present an empirical study of how MAS design decisions shape the tradeoff between task performance and attack resistance. Across three agentic environments (browser, desktop, and code) and 13 architectural configurations, we use stagewise evaluations that distinguish planning refusal, execution-stage interception, partial harmful execution, and successful attack completion to study three key design choices: (i) agent roles, which determine how authority and responsibility are allocated; (ii) communication topology, which shapes how and when agents interact; and (iii) memory, which determines the context and state visibility accessible to each agent. We find that multi-agent architectures are more vulnerable than standalone agents in the majority of configurations, with attack success rates varying by up to 3.8x at comparable or higher benign accuracy, and that no single design is universally safer. These results motivate the development of further evaluations that move beyond the security properties of a single agent.
Apr 9, 2026

ACIArena: Toward Unified Evaluation for Agent Cascading Injection

Collaboration and information sharing empower Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) but also introduce a critical security risk known as Agent Cascading Injection (ACI). In such attacks, a compromised agent exploits inter-agent trust to propagate malicious instructions, causing cascading failures across the system. However, existing studies consider only limited attack strategies and simplified MAS settings, limiting their generalizability and comprehensive evaluation. To bridge this gap, we introduce ACIArena, a unified framework for evaluating the robustness of MAS. ACIArena offers systematic evaluation suites spanning multiple attack surfaces (i.e., external inputs, agent profiles, inter-agent messages) and attack objectives (i.e., instruction hijacking, task disruption, information exfiltration). Specifically, ACIArena establishes a unified specification that jointly supports MAS construction and attack-defense modules. It covers six widely used MAS implementations and provides a benchmark of 1,356 test cases for systematically evaluating MAS robustness. Our benchmarking results show that evaluating MAS robustness solely through topology is insufficient; robust MAS require deliberate role design and controlled interaction patterns. Moreover, defenses developed in simplified environments often fail to transfer to real-world settings; narrowly scoped defenses may even introduce new vulnerabilities. ACIArena aims to provide a solid foundation for advancing deeper exploration of MAS design principles.