Adversarial Attacks on VLAs

VLA: Vision-Language-Action Model

Overview

Vision-language-action models turn camera observations and natural-language instructions into robot actions, so adversarial-attack research asks how small or hidden changes can derail grounding, planning, or control in embodied settings. Studies probe instruction edits and image perturbations, physical patches and textures, training-time backdoors, and faults in model weights or intermediate reasoning. Evaluations span manipulation simulators such as LIBERO, autonomous-driving scenarios, and real robot hardware; defenses include robust fine-tuning, runtime monitoring and recovery, and certified action or rollout guarantees. Work increasingly examines transferable, long-horizon, and adaptive threats, while a central challenge is improving robustness without sacrificing task-relevant perception or clean-task performance.

Latest papers

35 papers1 paper in the last four weeks, down 67% on the four weeks before. 0.0% of all new papers.

Apr 2, 2026

Tex3D: Objects as Attack Surfaces via Adversarial 3D Textures for Vision-Language-Action Models

Vision-language-action (VLA) models have shown strong performance in robotic manipulation, yet their robustness to physically realizable adversarial attacks remains underexplored. Existing studies reveal vulnerabilities through language perturbations and 2D visual attacks, but these attack surfaces are either less representative of real deployment or limited in physical realism. In contrast, adversarial 3D textures pose a more physically plausible and damaging threat, as they are naturally attached to manipulated objects and are easier to deploy in physical environments. Bringing adversarial 3D textures to VLA systems is nevertheless nontrivial. A central obstacle is that standard 3D simulators do not provide a differentiable optimization path from the VLA objective function back to object appearance, making it difficult to optimize through an end-to-end manner. To address this, we introduce Foreground-Background Decoupling (FBD), which enables differentiable texture optimization through dual-renderer alignment while preserving the original simulation environment. To further ensure that the attack remains effective across long-horizon and diverse viewpoints in the physical world, we propose Trajectory-Aware Adversarial Optimization (TAAO), which prioritizes behaviorally critical frames and stabilizes optimization with a vertex-based parameterization. Built on these designs, we present Tex3D, the first framework for end-to-end optimization of 3D adversarial textures directly within the VLA simulation environment. Experiments in both simulation and real-robot settings show that Tex3D significantly degrades VLA performance across multiple manipulation tasks, achieving task failure rates of up to 96.7%. Our empirical results expose critical vulnerabilities of VLA systems to physically grounded 3D adversarial attacks and highlight the need for robustness-aware training.
Mar 26, 2026

SABER: A Stealthy Agentic Black-Box Attack Framework for Vision-Language-Action Models

Vision-language-action (VLA) models enable robots to follow natural-language instructions grounded in visual observations, but the instruction channel also introduces a critical vulnerability: small textual perturbations can alter downstream robot behavior. Systematic robustness evaluation therefore requires a black-box attacker that can generate minimal yet effective instruction edits across diverse VLA models. To this end, we present SABER, an agent-centric approach for automatically generating instruction-based adversarial attacks on VLA models under bounded edit budgets. SABER uses a GRPO-trained ReAct attacker to generate small, plausible adversarial instruction edits using character-, token-, and prompt-level tools under a bounded edit budget that induces targeted behavioral degradation, including task failure, unnecessarily long execution, and increased constraint violations. On the LIBERO benchmark across six state-of-the-art VLA models, SABER reduces task success by 20.6%, increases action-sequence length by 55%, and raises constraint violations by 33%, while requiring 21.1% fewer tool calls and 54.7% fewer character edits than strong GPT-based baselines. These results show that small, plausible instruction edits are sufficient to substantially degrade robot execution, and that an agentic black-box pipeline offers a practical, scalable, and adaptive approach for red-teaming robotic foundation models. The codebase is publicly available at https://github.com/wuxiyang1996/SABER.
Mar 24, 2026

TRAP: Hijacking VLA CoT-Reasoning via Adversarial Patches

By integrating Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning, Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have demonstrated strong capabilities in robotic manipulation, particularly by improving generalization and interpretability. However, the security of CoT-based reasoning mechanisms remains largely unexplored. In this paper, we show that CoT reasoning introduces a novel attack vector for targeted behavior hijacking--for example, causing a robot to mistakenly deliver a knife to a person instead of an apple--without modifying the user's instruction. We first provide empirical evidence that CoT strongly governs action generation, even when it is semantically misaligned with the input instructions. Building on this observation, we propose TRAP, the first targeted behavior-hijacking adversarial attack against CoT-reasoning VLA models. By targeting the reasoning-to-action pathway, TRAP uses an adversarial patch (e.g., a tablecloth placed on the table) to steer intermediate CoT reasoning and downstream actions toward adversary-defined behaviors. Extensive evaluations on three representative reasoning VLAs, spanning distinct CoT reasoning mechanisms, demonstrate the effectiveness of TRAP. Notably, we implemented the patch by printing it on paper in a real-world setting. Our findings highlight the urgent need to secure CoT reasoning in VLA systems. The project page is available at https://zhengxian-huang.github.io/TRAP-website/.
Mar 12, 2026

Red-Teaming Vision-Language-Action Models via Quality Diversity Prompt Generation for Robust Robot Policies

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models have significant potential to enable general-purpose robotic systems for a range of vision-language tasks. However, the performance of VLA-based robots is highly sensitive to the precise wording of language instructions, and it remains difficult to predict when such robots will fail. We propose Quality Diversity (QD) optimization as a natural framework for red-teaming embodied models, and present Q-DIG (Quality Diversity for Diverse Instruction Generation), which performs red-teaming by scalably identifying diverse, natural language task descriptions that induce failures while remaining task-relevant. Q-DIG integrates QD techniques with Vision-Language Models (VLMs) to generate a broad spectrum of adversarial instructions that expose meaningful vulnerabilities in VLA behavior. Our results across multiple simulation benchmarks show that Q-DIG finds more diverse and meaningful failure modes compared to baseline methods, and that fine-tuning VLAs on the generated instructions improves task success rates. Furthermore, results from a user study highlight that Q-DIG generates prompts judged to be more natural and human-like than those from baselines. Finally, real-world evaluations of Q-DIG prompts show results consistent with simulation, and fine-tuning VLAs on the generated prompts further success rates on unseen instructions. Together, these findings suggest that Q-DIG is a promising approach for identifying vulnerabilities and improving the robustness of VLA-based robots. Our anonymous project website is at qdigvla.github.io.
Oct 13, 2025

DropVLA: An Action-Level Backdoor Attack on Vision-Language-Action Models

Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models map multimodal perception and language instructions to executable robot actions, making them particularly vulnerable to behavioral backdoor manipulation: a hidden trigger introduced during training can induce unintended physical actions while nominal task performance remains intact. Prior work on VLA backdoors primarily studies untargeted attacks or task-level hijacking, leaving fine-grained control over individual actions largely unexplored. In this work, we present DropVLA, an action-level backdoor attack that forces a reusable action primitive (e.g., open_gripper) to execute at attacker-chosen decision points under a realistic pipeline-black-box setting with limited data-poisoning access, using a window-consistent relabeling scheme for chunked fine-tuning. On OpenVLA-7B evaluated with LIBERO, vision-only poisoning achieves 98.67%-99.83% attack success rate (ASR) with only 0.31% poisoned episodes while preserving 98.50%-99.17% clean-task retention, and successfully triggers the targeted action within 25 control steps at 500 Hz (0.05 s). Text-only triggers are unstable at low poisoning budgets, and combining text with vision provides no consistent ASR improvement over vision-only attacks. The backdoor remains robust to moderate trigger variations and transfers across evaluation suites (96.27%, 99.09%), whereas text-only largely fails (0.72%). We further validate physical-world feasibility on a 7-DoF Franka arm with pi0-fast, demonstrating non-trivial attack efficacy under camera-relative motion that induces image-plane trigger drift. These results reveal that VLA models can be covertly steered at the granularity of safety-critical actions with minimal poisoning and without observable degradation of nominal performance.