Emotion Representation in Language Models

Emotion plays an important role in human cognition and performance. Motivated by this, we investigate whether analogous emotional signals can shape the behavior of large language models (LLMs) and agents. Existing emotion-aware studies mainly treat emotion as a surface-level style factor or a perception target, overlooking its mechanistic role in task processing. To address this limitation, we propose E-STEER, an interpretable emotion steering framework that enables direct representation-level intervention in LLMs and agents. It embeds emotion as a structured, controllable variable in hidden states, and with it, we examine the impact of emotion on objective reasoning, subjective generation, safety, and multi-step agent behaviors. The results reveal non-monotonic emotion-behavior relations consistent with established psychological theories, and show that specific emotions not only enhance LLM capability but also improve safety, and systematically shape multi-step agent behaviors.

Memory systems address the challenge of context loss in Large Language Model during prolonged interactions. However, compared to human cognition, the efficacy of these systems in processing emotion-related information remains inconclusive. To address this gap, we propose an emotion-enhanced memory evaluation benchmark to assess the performance of mainstream and state-of-the-art memory systems in handling affective information. We developed the Human-Like Memory Emotion (HLME) dataset, which evaluates memory systems across three dimensions: emotional information extraction, emotional memory updating, and emotional memory question answering. Experimental results indicate that none of the evaluated systems achieve robust performance across all three tasks. Our findings provide an objective perspective on the current deficiencies of memory systems in processing emotional memories and suggest a new trajectory for future research and system optimization.

Prior behavioural work suggests that some LLMs alter choices when options are framed as causing pain or pleasure, and that such deviations can scale with stated intensity. To bridge behavioural evidence (what the model does) with mechanistic interpretability (what computations support it), we investigate how valence-related information is represented and where it is causally used inside a transformer. Using Gemma-2-9B-it and a minimalist decision task modelled on prior work, we (i) map representational availability with layer-wise linear probing across streams, (ii) test causal contribution with activation interventions (steering; patching/ablation), and (iii) quantify dose-response effects over an epsilon grid, reading out both the 2-3 logit margin and digit-pair-normalised choice probabilities. We find that (a) valence sign (pain vs. pleasure) is perfectly linearly separable across stream families from very early layers (L0-L1), while a lexical baseline retains substantial signal; (b) graded intensity is strongly decodable, with peaks in mid-to-late layers and especially in attention/MLP outputs, and decision alignment is highest slightly before the final token; (c) additive steering along a data-derived valence direction causally modulates the 2-3 margin at late sites, with the largest effects observed in late-layer attention outputs (attn_out L14); and (d) head-level patching/ablation suggests that these effects are distributed across multiple heads rather than concentrated in a single unit. Together, these results link behavioural sensitivity to identifiable internal representations and intervention-sensitive sites, providing concrete mechanistic targets for more stringent counterfactual tests and broader replication. This work supports a more evidence-driven (a) debate on AI sentience and welfare, and (b) governance when setting policy, auditing standards, and safety safeguards.

Understanding human emotions is central to user-facing AI applications, safety alignment, and the simulation of human behavior. As emotional stimuli shape high-stakes behavior in Large Language Models (LLMs), there is increasing interest in how models represent emotion concepts internally. Mechanistic accounts of these representations, however, cannot be compared directly against humans: emotion processing in humans is highly distributed and yields no equivalent neural representation. To understand whether LLMs internalize emotion concepts in a way similar to humans, we propose characterizing the abstract concept of an emotion using external behavioral signatures, which we term behavioral representations. Using the theory of cognitive appraisals, which enables representing emotional situations along interpretable evaluative dimensions, we create a benchmark dataset of emotional scenarios spanning 15 emotion categories. We elicit behavioral representations of emotion concepts from LLMs and humans using our benchmark, and study their structural similarity. We find that LLMs represent emotion concepts more categorically, homogeneously, and determinately than humans, representing a single emotion concept with less internal diversity, and place different emotions further apart. The categorical structure of representations in LLMs is further robust to contextual variation, including with different task framing and demographic personas. Analyzing model checkpoints across different training stages, we also find that the discretized nature of representations appears after the mid-training stage itself and is unaffected by different post-training strategies. Through our results, we highlight a key difference in how LLMs behaviorally represent emotion concepts, curbing the subjectivity inherent to the human experience of emotions.