Persuasion in Language Models

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly employed in various question-answering tasks. However, recent studies showcase that LLMs are susceptible to persuasion and could adopt counterfactual beliefs. We present a systematic evaluation of LLM susceptibility to persuasion under the \emph{Source--Message--Channel--Receiver} (SMCR) communication framework. Across six mainstream Large Language Models (LLMs) and three domains (factual knowledge, medical QA, and social bias), we analyze how different persuasive strategies influence stated belief stability over multiple interaction turns. We further examine whether verbalized confidence prompting (i.e., eliciting self-reported confidence scores) affects resistance to persuasion. Results show that the smallest model (Llama 3.2-3B) exhibits extreme compliance, with 82.5% of belief changes occurring at the first persuasive turn (average end turn of 1.1--1.4). Contrary to expectations, verbalized confidence prompting \emph{increases} vulnerability by accelerating belief erosion rather than enhancing robustness. Finally, an exploratory study of adversarial fine-tuning reveals highly model-dependent effectiveness: GPT-4o-mini achieves near-complete robustness (98.6%), and Mistral~7B improves substantially (35.7% $\rightarrow$ 79.3%), but Llama models remain highly susceptible ($<$14% RQ1) even when fine-tuned on their own failure cases. Together, these findings highlight substantial model-dependent limits of current robustness interventions and offer guidance for developing more trustworthy LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to be persuasive across a variety of contexts. But it remains unclear whether this persuasive power advantages accuracy, or if bad actors can just as easily use LLMs to promote misbeliefs. Here, we investigate this question across four experiments in which participants (N = 3996 Americans) discussed a conspiracy theory they were uncertain about with an LLM we instructed to either argue against ("debunking") or for ("bunking") that conspiracy. Across several frontier models (with standard guardrails but prompted to allow lying), we did not find consistent evidence of a truth advantage: the LLMs were able to both substantially increase and decrease average conspiracy belief, and participants in the bunking condition rated the LLM as more informative and collaborative, and reported greater trust in AI, than those who were in the debunking condition. More encouragingly, however, debunking induced more large changes in belief, and subsequent corrections were able to reverse the bunking effect. Furthermore, simply prompting the model to only provide accurate information dramatically reduced bunking effectiveness, and one powerful frontier model (GPT 5.2) almost entirely refused to promote conspiracies, suggesting that it is possible for the right guardrails to favor accurate beliefs. Finally, we did find a stark truth asymmetry in the context of information sharing: debunking had a large positive impact on mock social media posts composed by participants, while bunking had little effect. Overall, our findings show that people are not inherently less susceptible to AI that misleads than to AI that informs, but that potential technical solutions exist to mitigate this risk.

Large language models (LLMs) still struggle with strategic persuasion, largely because existing approaches either neglect information asymmetry or rely on unrealistic pre-commitment assumptions. We introduce a type-induced commitment-communication mechanism that grounds Bayesian Persuasion (BP) in natural language dialogue without pre-commitment: the persuader narrates their potential types (e.g., honest vs. dishonest) to dynamically construct an information schema, enabling the persuadee to perform Bayesian belief updates within the conversation itself. We implement two variants: Semi-Formal-Natural-Language (SFNL) and Fully-Natural-Language (FNL), evaluating them against strong baselines across multiple LLMs and human judges. BP strategies consistently outperform baselines: SFNL excels in logical credibility, while FNL shows superior robustness and emotional resonance. We verify that gains stem from genuine Bayesian reasoning rather than superficial formatting, and we further show that supervised fine-tuning enables small models to match the persuasive performance of much larger ones.

Understanding persuasion is critical for the safety and reliability of multi-agent systems built on large language models (LLMs). This paper studies persuasion dynamics by contrasting general LLMs with Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) that employ explicit ``thinking'' processes. Through large-scale experiments on objective (MMLU) and subjective (PersuasionBench and Perspectrum) tasks, we identify Persuasion Duality: reasoning enhances an agent's persuasive power while simultaneously increasing its resistance to persuasion. For LRMs, adding thinking content increases persuasion rates by 21 pp on average, yet reduces susceptibility to incorrect persuasion by up to 10 pp on objective tasks. Despite these gains, we uncover a critical vulnerability: persuasiveness often stems from superficial cues such as response length and repetition rather than logical validity. Non-semantic padding or repeated conclusions can match or exceed the persuasive effect of coherent reasoning, revealing a strong length bias in agents' judgments. We further show that persuasion propagates non-linearly in multi-hop agent chains, where intermediate agents may amplify or attenuate influence depending on task subjectivity. Finally, guided by attention analysis, we propose a prompt-level adversarial argument detection method that consistently improves agent robustness.