Overview

Regret minimization measures the cost of learning over time by comparing decisions with a benchmark, often the best fixed action or strategy chosen in hindsight. In bandits, UCB, Thompson sampling, and explore-then-commit balance information gathering with reward; in online optimization, Hedge, follow-the-regularized-leader, and mirror descent adapt to incoming losses. In games, counterfactual regret minimization and swap-regret methods help find equilibria, while dynamic-regret methods track changing comparators. Many classic settings have tight regret bounds, but guarantees still depend sharply on feedback, assumptions about adversaries or nonstationarity, and the chosen objective, such as cumulative versus final-decision quality.

Latest papers

125 papers13 papers in the last four weeks, down 13% on the four weeks before. 0.1% of all new papers.

Aug 1, 2024

Online Linear Programming with Batching

We study Online Linear Programming (OLP) with batching. The planning horizon is cut into KK batches, and decisions on orders can be delayed to the end of their associated batch. The ability to delay decisions improves operational performance, as measured by regret. We study two questions: (1) What is a lower bound on the regret as a function of KK and the length of the planning horizon? (2) Which algorithms can achieve this regret lower bound? This paper analyzes these questions when the distribution of the reward has a continuous support. We provide an Ω(log⁡K)Ω(\log K) regret lower bound in the single-resource case, and we provide pricing algorithms having an O(log⁡K)O(\log K) regret in the setting with Poisson arrivals and multiple types of resources. All the algorithms update the prices at most KK times and only delay orders of the first and the last batches. All the regret bounds are independent of the length of the planning horizon. Finally, we study a more realistic large support setting where the number of distinct order types is finite but scales with the total number of orders. We prove that our Θ(log⁡K)Θ(\log K) bounds still hold for the batching operation of a multisecretary problem with discretized uniform rewards in this large support setting, provided the support grows fast enough. This suggests that the continuous support setting that is the paper's focus serves as a useful theoretical surrogate for the more realistic large finite support setting.
Jun 10, 2024

Satisficing Regret Minimization in Bandits: Constant Rate and Light-Tailed Distribution

Motivated by the concept of satisficing in decision-making, we consider the problem of satisficing regret minimization in bandit optimization. In this setting, the learner aims at selecting satisficing arms (arms with mean reward exceeding a certain threshold value) as frequently as possible. The performance is measured by satisficing regret, which is the cumulative deficit of the chosen arm's mean reward compared to the threshold. We propose SELECT, a general algorithmic template for Satisficing REgret Minimization via SampLing and LowEr Confidence bound Testing, that attains constant expected satisficing regret for a wide variety of bandit optimization problems in the realizable case (i.e., a satisficing arm exists). As a complement, SELECT also enjoys the same (standard) regret guarantee as the oracle in the non-realizable case. To further ensure stability of the algorithm, we introduce SELECT-LITE that achieves a light-tailed satisficing regret distribution plus a constant expected satisficing regret in the realizable case and a sub-linear expected (standard) regret in the non-realizable case. Notably, SELECT-LITE can operate on learning oracles with heavy-tailed (standard) regret distribution. More importantly, our results reveal the surprising compatibility between constant expected satisficing regret and light-tailed satisficing regret distribution, which is in sharp contrast to the case of (standard) regret. Finally, we conduct numerical experiments to validate the performance of SELECT and SELECT-LITE on both synthetic datasets and a real-world dynamic pricing case study.
Jun 5, 2023

Calibrated Stackelberg Games: Learning Optimal Commitments Against Calibrated Agents

We introduce Calibrated Stackelberg Games (CSGs), a generalization of the standard Stackelberg Games (SGs) framework. In CSGs, a principal repeatedly interacts with an agent who (contrary to standard SGs) does not have direct access to the principal's action but instead best-responds to calibrated forecasts about it. This framework provides a powerful and realistic modeling tool that goes beyond assuming that agents use ad hoc and highly specified algorithms for interacting in strategic settings and instead builds on statistical foundations of forecasts and calibration. We show that in CSGs, despite both the principal and the agent having less information than in standard SGs, the principal's optimal utility remains upper and lower bounded by the Stackelberg value of the one-shot game, in both finite and continuous settings. Alongside CSGs, we develop stronger notions of calibration and corresponding algorithms that address two central challenges for calibration in game-theoretic environments. First, achieving point-wise calibration typically incurs an error that scales exponentially with the dimension of the strategy space. Second, the principal's convergence rate in CSGs depends critically on the adaptivity of the agent's calibration algorithm. To address these challenges, we establish a meaningful, efficiently achievable relaxation of calibration based on conditioning on best-response regions. This yields the first notion of calibration in games with a statistical rate that only depends on the number of agents' actions rather than the dimension of the principal's strategy space and that leads to no-swap regret for the agent. We further develop adaptive calibration algorithms for the agents that provide fine-grained, any-time calibration guarantees against adversarial sequences, enabling the principal to achieve faster convergence in CSGs.
May 27, 2023

Hierarchical Deep Counterfactual Regret Minimization

Imperfect Information Games (IIGs) are used to model games under uncertainty or lack complete information. Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) is one of the most successful families of algorithms for IIGs. The integration of skill-based strategy learning with CFR could potentially mirror more human-like decision-making and improve learning on complex IIGs. It enables the learning of a hierarchical strategy, wherein low-level components represent skills for solving subgames and the high-level component manages the transition between skills. In this paper, we introduce the first hierarchical version of Deep CFR (HDCFR), an innovative method that boosts learning efficiency in tasks involving extensively large state spaces and deep game trees. Notably, HDCFR enables learning with predefined (human) expertise and extracting skills transferable to similar tasks. We first present the algorithm and establish its theory in a tabular setting, including hierarchical CFR update rules and a variance-reduced Monte Carlo sampling extension for the model-free setting, where backtracking is infeasible. We then extend HDCFR to large-scale tasks via deep learning objectives that match the tabular targets under exact function fitting. Code: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/HDCFR_RUN-677B.
Feb 3, 2023

Robust Budget Pacing with a Single Sample

Major Internet advertising platforms offer budget pacing tools as a standard service for advertisers to manage their ad campaigns. Given the inherent non-stationarity in an advertiser's value and also competing advertisers' values over time, a commonly used approach is to learn a target expenditure plan that specifies a target spend as a function of time, and then run a controller that tracks this plan. This raises the question: how many historical samples are required to learn a good expenditure plan? We study this question by considering an advertiser repeatedly participating in TT second-price auctions, where the tuple of her value and the highest competing bid is drawn from an unknown time-varying distribution. The advertiser seeks to maximize her total utility subject to her budget constraint. Prior work has shown the sufficiency of Tlog⁡TT\log T samples per distribution to achieve the optimal O(T)O(\sqrt{T})-regret. We dramatically improve this state-of-the-art and show that just one sample per distribution is enough to achieve the near-optimal O~(T)\tilde O(\sqrt{T})-regret, while still being robust to noise in the sampling distributions.