The Contribution of XAI for the Safe Development and Certification of AI: An Expert-Based Analysis

Artificial intelligence now decides who receives a loan, who is flagged for criminal investigation, and whether an autonomous vehicle brakes in time. Governments have responded: the EU AI Act, the NIST Risk Management Framework, and the Council of Europe Convention all demand that high-risk systems demonstrate safety before deployment. Yet beneath this regulatory consensus lies a critical vacuum: none specifies what ``acceptable risk'' means in quantitative terms, and none provides a technical method for verifying that a deployed system actually meets such a threshold. The regulatory architecture is in place; the verification instrument is not. This gap is not theoretical. As the EU AI Act moves into full enforcement, developers face mandatory conformity assessments without established methodologies for producing quantitative safety evidence - and the systems most in need of oversight are opaque statistical inference engines that resist white-box scrutiny. This paper provides the missing instrument. Drawing on the aviation certification paradigm, we propose a two-stage framework that transforms AI risk regulation into engineering practice. In Stage One, a competent authority formally fixes an acceptable failure probability $δ$ and an operational input domain $\varepsilon$ - a normative act with direct civil liability implications. In Stage Two, the RoMA and gRoMA statistical verification tools compute a definitive, auditable upper bound on the system's true failure rate, requiring no access to model internals and scaling to arbitrary architectures. We demonstrate how this certificate satisfies existing regulatory obligations, shifts accountability upstream to developers, and integrates with the legal frameworks that exist today.

Explainable AI (XAI) helps users interpret model behavior and identify potential faults. Agentic XAI systems use Large Language Models (LLMs) to make explanations more accessible through natural-language interaction, but they can also produce plausible yet unfaithful explanations. This risk arises because unreliable XAI outputs for complex models can be amplified by LLMs and mislead users. We propose Faithful Agentic XAI (FAX), a framework that improves explanation faithfulness through explicit verification. FAX decomposes draft explanations into claims and cross-checks them against inherently faithful tools, filtering unsupported or contradictory claims before final generation. We also introduce CRAFTER-XAI-Bench, an open-world reinforcement learning benchmark with complex policies, diverse goals, and challenging scenarios for assessing model-specific faithfulness. On CRAFTER-XAI-Bench, FAX improves simulation faithfulness from 0.20 for the strongest baseline to 0.46 while maintaining high informativeness, relevance, and fluency. On three tabular benchmarks, FAX performs competitively with prior Agentic XAI baselines, but our analysis shows that these settings can conflate task accuracy with model-specific faithfulness. These findings show that explicit verification is essential for faithful Agentic XAI and that that faithfulness benchmarks must be designed to test explanations against the behavior of the target model itself.

Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) is increasingly rec ognized as essential for deploying machine learning systems in safety critical environments. In Automatic Target Recognition (ATR), where models operate on image, video, radar, and multisensor data, high pre dictive performance alone is insufficient. Model decisions must also be interpretable, reliable, and suitable for validation. This paper presents a structured evaluation of explainability methods in the context of safety-critical ATR systems: We identify major XAI paradigms, including saliency-based, attention-based, and surrogate ap proaches, as well as recent detection-aware extensions. Based on this, we formalize explainability as an assurance-oriented assessment problem, introduce a taxonomy, and assess these methods with respect to four key dimensions: interpretability, robustness, vulnerability to manipula tion, and suitability for validation and verification. The analysis identifies systematic limitations of current post-hoc explanation methods. In par ticular, we derive critical failure modes such as spurious explanations, instability under perturbations, and overtrust induced by visually con vincing outputs. These findings indicate that widely used XAI techniques may be insufficient for safety-critical deployment. Finally, we discuss implications for ATR systems and outline directions toward more robust, causally grounded, and physically informed explain ability methods. Our results emphasize the need to move beyond visually plausible explanations toward approaches that support reliable decision making and system-level assurance.