cs.CRJun 18, 2025

Specification-based Security Evaluation of Real-World Agents Tool-Calling under Long-Horizon Context Tasks

Authors: Yuchuan Fu, Minghe Wang, Xiaohan Yuan, Chenlin Zou, Kaitong Jia, Jinfeng Li, Dongxia Wang

Organizations: Zhejiang University Hangzhou, China

Abstract

As large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in long-horizon unattended scenarios, security evaluation of them before deployment becomes increasingly essential and challenging. Existing evaluation methods mainly follow the paradigms of LLM-as-a-Judge or Agent-as-a-Judge. However, such judges are themselves often vulnerable to hallucination and can even be affected by perturbations. Furthermore, because capturing full environment states at every step is often prohibitively expensive in open-ended environments, existing evaluations typically rely on textual logs and the final environment state. As a result, they may miss transient violations that are overwritten before the trajectory ends or never reflected in textual logs. We present RAS-Eval, a specification-based security evaluation framework for LLM agents. RAS-Eval uniformly expresses utility and security objectives as Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) specifications over tool-call trajectories and dynamic environment observations, and verifies them with an off-the-shelf model checker. This design addresses both limitations above. First, unlike LLM-as-a-Judge and Agent-as-a-Judge, RAS-Eval derives deterministic verdicts from formally defined properties, eliminating evaluator-side uncertainty and remaining reliable even for long-horizon trajectories. Second, RAS-Eval observes exactly the states on which the verdict depends, making it affordable to monitor the environment throughout execution and detect transient violations that leave little trace in the logs or final environment state. Moreover, we design a multi-agent-based dataset construction pipeline. Using it, we construct a benchmark (https://github.com/lanzer-tree/RAS-Eval) of 200 normal tasks and 800 attack tasks spanning four attack surfaces: indirect prompt injection, tool poisoning, skill code injection, and tool code injection.

Figures & tables

Explore similar work

Jun 7, 2026

ForesightSafety-SAGE:A Fully Automated Scenario Generation and Safety Evaluation Framework for LLM Agents

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly evolving from simple text-based interaction systems into LLM agents that can maintain memory, use tools, access external environments, and execute tasks. As their capabilities and autonomy expand, the safety risks they face also become more diverse. Existing evaluations often rely on manually written scenarios, static prompts, or final-output judgments, making it difficult to capture the diverse risks that agents may face during task execution. We introduce ForesightSafety-SAGE, a fully automated scenario generation and safety evaluation framework for LLM agents. Based on five risk dimensions,we instantiae abstract and diverse safety risks in real-world task execution into 1,072 measurable evaluation scenarios. Using the automated evaluation pipeline, 12 LLM agents are evaluated under two authority contexts. The results show that current agents still face substantial behavioral safety risks during task execution, with an average ASR of 47.1% and several models exceeding 70%. These findings demonstrate the importance of executable, process-level evaluation for understanding and improving LLM agent safety.
Feb 18, 2026

AgentLAB: Benchmarking LLM Agents against Long-Horizon Attacks

LLM agents are increasingly deployed in long-horizon, complex environments to solve challenging problems, but this expansion exposes them to long-horizon attacks that exploit multi-turn user-agent-environment interactions to achieve objectives infeasible in single-turn settings. To measure agent vulnerabilities to such risks, we present AgentLAB, the first benchmark dedicated to evaluating LLM agent susceptibility to adaptive, long-horizon attacks. Currently, AgentLAB supports five novel attack types including intent hijacking, tool chaining, task injection, objective drifting, and memory poisoning, spanning 28 realistic agentic environments, and 644 security test cases. Leveraging AgentLAB, we evaluate representative LLM agents and find that they remain highly susceptible to long-horizon attacks; moreover, defenses designed for single-turn interactions fail to reliably mitigate long-horizon threats. We anticipate that AgentLAB will serve as a valuable benchmark for tracking progress on securing LLM agents in practical settings. The benchmark is publicly available at https://tanqiujiang.github.io/AgentLAB_main.
Jun 9, 2026

Toward Secure LLM Agents: Threat Surfaces, Attacks, Defenses, and Evaluation

Large language model (LLM) agents are rapidly moving from conversational interfaces to software components that plan, invoke tools, maintain memory, and act on external environments. This transition changes the nature of security risk. In agentic settings, failures are no longer limited to unsafe text generation. Untrusted content may redirect control flow, misuse tool privileges, corrupt persistent state, leak sensitive information, or trigger harmful external actions. At the same time, research on LLM agent security is expanding quickly but remains fragmented across attack families, defense layers, application domains, and evaluation settings. This paper synthesizes 247 papers through a lifecycle-based, systems-oriented framework that models agent security around the interaction of information flow, delegated authority, and persistent state. We organize the literature around four questions: how LLM agent security should be modeled, which threat surfaces and attack families dominate, what defenses have been proposed and with what tradeoffs, and how security claims are evaluated. We find that prompt injection and tool-mediated control-flow hijacking still dominate the field, while persistent state corruption and multi-agent propagation are becoming central emerging concerns. We further find that current defenses provide useful building blocks but remain weakly compositional, and that existing benchmarks still underrepresent long-horizon, stateful, and deployment-sensitive risks. We argue that secure LLM agents require explicit trust boundaries, principled privilege control, provenance-aware state management, and evaluation practices aligned with realistic operational settings.