Organizations: Department of Computer Science, Royal Holloway University of London, Egham Hill, Egham, TW200EX, Surrey, United Kingdom.
Abstract
Classical game-theoretic models typically assume rational agents, complete information, and common knowledge of payoffs - assumptions that are often violated in real-world MAS characterized by uncertainty, misaligned perceptions, and nested beliefs. To overcome these limitations, researchers have proposed extensions that incorporate models of cognitive constraints, subjective beliefs, and heterogeneous reasoning. Among these, hypergame theory extends the classical paradigm by explicitly modeling agents' subjective perceptions of the strategic scenario, known as perceptual games, in which agents may hold divergent beliefs about the structure, payoffs, or available actions. We present a systematic review of agent-compatible applications of hypergame theory, examining how its descriptive capabilities have been adapted to dynamic and interactive MAS contexts. We analyze 49 selected studies from cybersecurity, robotics, social simulation, communications, and general game-theoretic modeling. Building on a formal introduction to hypergame theory and its two major extensions - hierarchical hypergames and HNF - we develop agent-compatibility criteria and an agent-based classification framework to assess integration patterns and practical applicability. Our analysis reveals prevailing tendencies, including the prevalence of hierarchical and graph-based models in deceptive reasoning and the simplification of extensive theoretical frameworks in practical applications. We identify structural gaps, including the limited adoption of HNF-based models, the lack of formal hypergame languages, and unexplored opportunities for modeling human-agent and agent-agent misalignment. By synthesizing trends, challenges, and open research directions, this review provides a new roadmap for applying hypergame theory to enhance the realism and effectiveness of strategic modeling in dynamic multi-agent environments.
As large language models and increasingly capable AI agents are deployed in high-risk settings, aligning them with complex human values has become a central challenge. Existing alignment methods, while effective in improving helpfulness, harmlessness, and controllability, often struggle to capture real-world preferences that are context-dependent, non-transitive, and shaped by dynamic multi-party interactions. This survey reviews AI alignment through a game-theoretic lens. Specifically, it organizes recent progress around key game-theoretic elements and synthesizes the literature along three challenges: preference diversity, alignment priority, and temporal dynamics. This perspective clarifies where current alignment methods genuinely benefit from game-theoretic analysis, where the framework is looser, and what challenges remain in building robust, adaptive, and verifiable AI systems.
Agentic AI systems are increasingly deployed not in isolation, but inside social environments populated by other agents and humans, such as in social media platforms, multi-agent LLM pipelines or autonomous robotics fleets. In these settings, system behavior emerges not from individual agents alone, but from the multi-agent interactions over time. Emergent dynamics of individuals in a social group have been long studied by social scientists in human contexts. \textbf{This position paper argues that agentic AI systems must be modeled with social theory as a structural prior, and formalizes a Multi-Agent Social Systems (MASS) framework for how agents interact and influence to generate system-level outcomes.} We represent MASS as a class of dynamical system of information generation, local influence and interaction structure, formulated by four structural priors anchored in social theory: strategic heterogeneity, networked-constrained dependence, co-evolution and distributional instability. We demonstrate the importance of each structural prior through formal propositions, and articulate a research agenda for how MASS should be modeled, evaluated and governed.
Lynnette Hui Xian Ng, Iain J. Cruickshank, Adrian Xuan Wei Lim +1
We propose a game-theoretic framework for adaptive multi-agent intelligent systems. Unlike classical game theory, which often treats strategies as primitive objects chosen by perfectly rational agents, the proposed framework provides a mathematical foundation for studying equilibrium in NeuroAI and can be viewed as an extension of game theory under relaxed assumptions, including partial observability, bounded computation, and uncertainty. At its core, Multilevel Interactive Equilibrium (MIE) generalizes the classical Nash equilibrium to intelligent systems with internal computation. Rather than being defined solely at the level of observable behavior, equilibrium emerges when neural learning dynamics, cognitive representations, and behavioral strategies mutually stabilize between interacting agents. This framework applies uniformly to interactions between two biological brains, two artificial agents, or hybrid human-AI systems. We discuss applications of multilevel game theory to human-autonomous vehicle driving, human-machine interaction, human-large language model (LLM) interaction, and computational psychiatry. We also outline experimental strategies and computational methods for estimating MIE and discuss challenges and prospects for future research.