Participatory budgeting is a democratic innovation that allows citizens to propose and vote on public investment projects. To help organizers manage large volumes of submissions, we design and test privacy-preserving methods for algorithmic shortlisting. These algorithms predict which projects are likely to be funded using only project features and anonymous historical voting data. We demonstrate the limitations of a naive approach that uses a large language model to rank projects based on past success and propose a vote-based pipeline that enables state-of-the-art LLMs to perform on par with classical machine learning. Our findings indicate that user preferences in participatory budgeting are stable enough to allow algorithmic shortlisting to approximate an initial selection of projects effectively.
Many high-stakes AI deployments proceed only if every stakeholder deems the system acceptable relative to their own minimum standard. With randomization over a finite menu of options, this becomes a feasibility question: does there exist a lottery over options that clears all stakeholders' acceptability bars? We study a query model where the algorithm proposes lotteries and receives only binary accept/reject feedback. We give deterministic and randomized algorithms that either find a unanimously acceptable lottery or certify infeasibility; adaptivity can avoid eliciting many stakeholders' constraints, and randomization further reduces the expected elicitation cost relative to full elicitation. We complement these upper bounds with worst-case lower bounds (in particular, linear dependence on the number of stakeholders and logarithmic dependence on precision are unavoidable). Finally, we develop learning-augmented algorithms that exploit natural forms of advice (e.g., likely binding stakeholders or a promising lottery), improving query complexity when predictions are accurate while preserving worst-case guarantees.
To scale up collective decision-making, participatory democracy platforms such as Polis and Remesh enable online deliberation among thousands of participants. However, at this scale, participants cannot review every opinion submitted by others, producing highly sparse voting data that misrepresent patterns of consensus, conflict, and minority support. Platforms therefore increasingly rely on Preference Inference (PI) models to predict missing votes. Yet this automation is not neutral: inferred preferences can artificially amplify, suppress, or reorder existing patterns of support, ultimately reshaping how the outcomes of a deliberation are interpreted. More generally, we lack a systematic understanding of how existing PI methods affect the collective preference landscape. To address this gap, we benchmark several existing PI approaches in this context. Moving beyond conventional user-centric evaluations centered on the accuracy of individual predictions, we introduce a collective-centric evaluation framework that measures whether inferred votes preserve salient properties of the broader preference landscape. We further contribute the largest multilingual dataset of its kind: four consultations spanning over 90k participants, 1M votes, and 22 languages. Our experiments show that models with comparable predictive accuracy can differ substantially in the degree to which they preserve the collective structure. These results demonstrate that accuracy alone is insufficient for evaluating PI in democratic settings. By contributing a novel comprehensive and collective-centric evaluation benchmark for the task of PI, this work aims to support the development of AI systems that scale deliberation without compromising the integrity of its democratic outcomes.
Pierre-Antoine Lequeu, Salim Hafid, Paul Lerner +6
Full justified representation (FJR) is among the strongest known satisfiable proportionality axioms for approval-based committee elections. Recent work has shown that an FJR committee can be found in polynomial time, but verifying whether a given committee satisfies FJR remains coNP-complete. We introduce FJR+, a strict strengthening of FJR and EJR+ that can be verified and satisfied in polynomial time. We then analyze the Residual-Budget Greedy (RBG) algorithm and prove that it selects a partial committee such that every size-k completion satisfies FJR+. This freedom allows us to use sequential Phragmén to obtain a priceable completion. The resulting rule always satisfies FJR+ and the sub-core, and it is priceable whenever at least k candidates receive an approval. We also obtain a Droop-quota version of FJR+. Finally, we extend FJR+ to approval-based participatory budgeting with arbitrary project costs. A project-specific version of RBG computes this property in polynomial time and can be continued to a priceable outcome satisfying a cost-based version of the sub-core.