cs.AIAug 9, 2025

A memory-based active inference model of DishBrain-like adaptive behaviour

Authors: Aswin Paul, Moein Khajehnejad, Forough Habibollahi, Brett J. Kagan, Adeel Razi

Organizations: Turner Institute for Brain and Mental Health, School of Psychological Sciences, Monash University, Clayton 3800, Australia · VERSES, Los Angeles, California, USA · Cortical Labs Pty Ltd, Melbourne 3056, Australia · CIFAR Azrieli Global Scholars Program, CIFAR, Toronto, Canada

Abstract

Recent and rapid advances in artificial intelligence (AI) make it increasingly important to understand the foundations of adaptive behaviour in autonomous agents, especially for building safe and efficient systems. While artificial neural networks have dominated the development of AI, recent work has begun to explore living biological neuronal networks as an alternative substrate for computation. These systems promise remarkable data and sample efficiency and rich dynamics, and may also inspire explainable and biologically plausible models. Here, we develop an experiment-informed active inference framework to model decision-making in closed-loop agents that mirror experimental setups using biological neurons. Using a generative model whose dimensions are matched to an experiment protocol, we systematically compare three decision-making schemes within this common generative model. Under matched episode counts (i.e. total data available for learning) to the in-vitro experiment, our simulations show that agents with short memory horizons reach a level of performance close to that of mouse and human cortical cultures (DishBrain platform), whereas longer memory horizons depart from it substantially. Increasing the planning horizon, by contrast, confers no comparable benefit. Because all model parameters are explicit, we can also track the quantities in our generative model that accompany this improvement, such as the risk term and the entropy of the transition and state-action mappings. Together, these results illustrate how active inference offers a formal language for comparing decision-making schemes in similar closed-loop control environments.

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