Deductive Logic in Language Models: Horizontal vs Vertical Reasoning
Authors: Davide Maltoni, Matteo Ferrara
Organizations: Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of Bologna, Italy
Abstract
Recent language models exhibit significant logical reasoning abilities, yet the mechanisms supporting deductive inference remain poorly understood. This paper studies small transformer-based language models trained from scratch on multi-step deductive tasks, focusing on the distinction between horizontal reasoning, where intermediate steps are generated autoregressively, and vertical reasoning, where inference unfolds implicitly across layers before the first output token is produced. We analyze two synthetic tasks: logical consequence over chains of symbolic implications and root-to-leaf navigation in binary trees. Mechanistic interpretability reveals that Chain-of-Thought supervision enables models to learn rule-based inference rather than statistical shortcuts. In the horizontal setting, a shallow attention-only model develops interpretable circuits for rule completion, rule chaining, and final decision making, largely implemented through induction-head-like mechanisms. We further introduce a truncated pseudoinverse method to decode the information carried by queries, keys, and values. For vertical reasoning, Chain-of-Thought appears to act less as explicit step-by-step guidance and more as a form of curriculum learning, helping the model acquire increasingly complex reasoning patterns. Without Chain-of-Thought, models tend to memorize or exploit dataset biases. These results provide a low-level account of how transformers can implement deductive reasoning and suggest how Chain-of-Thought may serve different functions in horizontal and vertical reasoning.
Modern language models (LMs) can learn to perform new tasks in different ways: in instruction following, the target task is described explicitly in natural language; in few-shot prompting, the task is specified implicitly with a small number of examples; in instruction inference, LMs are presented with in-context examples and are then prompted to generate a natural language task description before making predictions. Each of these procedures may be thought of as invoking a different form of reasoning: instruction following involves deductive reasoning, few-shot prompting involves inductive reasoning, and instruction inference involves abductive reasoning. How do these different capabilities relate? Across four LMs (from the gpt and llama families) and two learning problems (involving arithmetic functions and machine translation) we find a strong dissociation between the different types of reasoning: LMs can sometimes learn effectively from few-shot prompts even when they are unable to explain their own prediction rules; conversely, they sometimes infer useful task descriptions while completely failing to learn from human-generated descriptions of the same task. Our results highlight the non-systematic nature of reasoning even in some of today's largest LMs, and underscore the fact that very different learning mechanisms may be invoked by seemingly similar prompting procedures.
Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is the dominant paradigm for inference-time scaling in language models, yet the causal influence of individual steps on the final answer poorly understood. We estimate each step's causal importance via early exit and use this measure to study how answers form across the reasoning traces of several model families. Across diverse tasks, we find that reasoning typically crosses a \emph{commitment boundary} -- a sharp transition from transient intermediate guesses to a stable, high-confidence answer. This transition often happens in a single step, well before the model's reasoning block ends, and is followed by \emph{epiphenomenal} CoT steps that leave the final answer probability unaltered. Using attention probes, we show that answer-formation stages can be linearly decoded from intermediate reasoning steps with high accuracy and generalize robustly to unseen reasoning tasks. We exploit this signal to early-exit reasoning blocks at the commitment boundary, reducing the length of CoTs up to 55% on average with negligible impact on model performance.
Daniel Scalena, Sara Candussio, Luca Bortolussi +3
Language models typically reason via explicit chain-of-thought (CoT), generating intermediate steps token-by-token. Latent CoT offers an alternative: it performs multi-step reasoning in the model's hidden states, replacing decoded tokens with continuous representations for greater efficiency. However, existing latent CoT methods underperform explicit CoT beyond 1B parameters, and the gap widens with scale. Looped, or recurrent-depth, Transformers, which reuse their weights to increase computation depth without adding parameters, are a natural fit for latent reasoning. We therefore ask whether looped Transformers can bridge this gap. We answer affirmatively with a simple recipe: a looped padded Transformer that processes K latent blocks in parallel for R iterations, with a cross-entropy loss on each latent position's gold CoT-step token, similar to explicit CoT supervision. We instantiate it as LOTUS (Looped Transformers with parallel supervision on latents). LOTUS is, to our knowledge, the first latent-CoT method to bridge the gap to explicit CoT at the 3B scale, while cutting thought-phase latency by 2.5x-6.9x from compact math expressions to natural language. Projecting LOTUS's post-loop latents through the base LM head recovers the gold reasoning steps and even surfaces alternative valid intermediate steps, evidence that its latent space is interpretable and CoT-aligned. Ablations confirm that both the looped backbone and the parallel supervision on gold CoT tokens are essential. Code is available at https://github.com/yingfan-bot/lotus.