The Alignment Veto: How Safety Training Suppresses Cultural Knowledge in LLMs

Safety alignment in language models operates through two mechanistically distinct systems: refusal neurons that gate whether harmful knowledge is expressed, and concept neurons that encode the harmful knowledge itself. By targeting a single neuron in each system, we demonstrate both directions of failure -- bypassing safety on explicit harmful requests via suppression, and inducing harmful content from innocent prompts via amplification -- across seven models spanning two families and 1.7B to 70B parameters, without any training or prompt engineering. Our findings suggest that safety alignment is not robustly distributed across model weights but is mediated by individual neurons that are each causally sufficient to gate refusal behavior -- suppressing any one of the identified refusal neurons bypasses safety alignment across diverse harmful requests.

Warning: This paper studies stereotypes and biases, and contains potentially disturbing examples, used for illustration purposes only. Our findings should not be interpreted as an argument against alignment. Instead, this paper highlights the need for principled approaches to more advanced alignment. Alignment aims to ensure that large language models (LLMs) behave safely and reliably, including by avoiding unsafe inferences. However, we show that such safety-oriented behaviors can misfire: models may reject warranted conclusions even when they are explicitly supported by context. We call this failure mode misfired alignment, where alignment-induced changes cause LLMs to override explicit evidence. To quantify this phenomenon, specifically on stereotype-related alignment, we introduce VETO, a benchmark consisting of 2,032 BBQ-derived contrastive pairs, and define a new metric, Misfired Alignment Rate (MAR), which measures on a 0 to 100 scale how often a model fails on a stereotype-related question but succeeds on its contrastive counterpart. We benchmark 25 LLMs on VETO, and show that all LLMs, including the most recent ones, exhibit non-trivial (4.7 to 18.9%) MARs while all human participants achieve 0.0% MAR. Controlled priming experiments further show that alignment-induced cues can substantially amplify MAR across LLMs, indicating that these failures are not merely artifacts of individual examples but can be induced by safety-related framing. Mechanistic analyses on open-weight LLMs reveal late-layer suppression of evidence-supported answers, and comparisons between instruct and base LLMs suggest that this suppression emerges after instruction training. These findings show that current alignment methods can overgeneralize surface-level safety cues, to the point of overriding objective evidence, motivating more work on alignment objectives that better preserve contextual grounding.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed across cultural contexts but often reflect homogenized values inherited from training data. Evaluations of cultural alignment typically rely on direct prompting with survey-style questions, which frequently elicit neutral or safety-aligned responses and fail to capture underlying model preferences. We propose a framework for probing and steering latent cultural representations in LLMs along the two Inglehart--Welzel axes of the World Values Survey (WVS). By translating social value questions into scenario-based behavioral dilemmas, we extract token-level probabilities to measure implicit values and apply activation steering, optionally combined with country-conditioned prompting, to shift model behavior without retraining. Across three open-source LLMs and four target cultures, we find substantial variation in steerability and identify latent entanglement, where interventions along one cultural dimension induce shifts along another. This coupling mirrors correlations in human WVS data and persists across activation, prompt, and hybrid steering. It constrains axis-independent alignment, though general task performance is largely preserved.