When Assisting One Disempowers Another

As humans delegate more tasks and decisions to artificial intelligence (AI), we risk losing control of our individual and collective futures. Relatively simple algorithmic systems already steer human decision-making, such as social media feed algorithms that lead people to unintentionally and absent-mindedly scroll through engagement-optimized content. In this paper, we develop the idea of human agency by integrating philosophical and scientific theories of agency with AI-assisted evaluation methods: using large language models (LLMs) to simulate and validate user queries and to evaluate AI responses. We develop HumanAgencyBench (HAB), a scalable and adaptive diagnostic tool for six behaviors related to human agency. HAB measures the tendency of an AI assistant to Ask Clarifying Questions, Avoid Value Manipulation, Correct Misinformation, Defer Important Decisions, Encourage Learning, and Maintain Social Boundaries. We find low-to-moderate agency support in contemporary LLM-based assistants, with substantial variation across system developers and behaviors. For example, while Anthropic LLMs most support human agency overall, they are the least supportive LLMs in terms of Avoid Value Manipulation. These behaviors do not appear to consistently result from increasing LLM capabilities or instruction-following (e.g., RLHF); we encourage further study of these behaviors so that developers and users can better understand the complexities of modern human-AI interaction.

AI agents pose significant risks as they are granted increasing autonomy. A commonly proposed solution is human oversight and keeping a ''human in the loop'', but this is not a simple solution: Not only do current approaches to AI agent design impede effective human oversight, but the cognitive capacities required for it are also themselves degraded by extended use of AI systems. This position paper argues that current approaches to the development and deployment of AI agent systems do not support effective human oversight -- they contribute to its degradation. To address this, a top priority in the advancement of AI agents should be supporting the situated goals and cognitive requirements of effective human oversight, treating the human needs of overseers at the same level of importance as AI agent capability. To put this idea into practice, we connect work on automation and human-computer interaction to AI agent processes, outlining design-level affordances and organizational protocols that (1) support overseers in exercising critical judgement and (2) counteract the skill atrophy that arises from extended use of automation. We urge developers and deployers to adopt these or similar approaches. Without explicit support for the cognitive demands of effective human-agent interaction, AI agent systems will continue to passively incentivize the degradation of the very human skills they rely on.

Agentic AI promises a more flexible form of digital agency: systems that can act on users' behalf, from filtering content to negotiating prices to selecting services. Whether it will empower users is an open question, and we argue that the answer depends on more than the technology. We conduct a comparative case analysis of four more mature domains where similar forms of agency arose: browser-based ad blockers, platform recommender systems, financial robo-advisors, and email spam governance. Across the cases, decisions about whose interests agents would serve were resolved through technical arrangements: API choices, protocol governance, industry standards, and default configurations. Beyond their technical form, these were political decisions. We identify this as depoliticization, a concept from political theory, here at work in technological systems. Its most consequential effect is that individual outcomes and collective contestation capacity can move in opposite directions: spam inbox quality improved substantially while the organized capacity to contest spam governance collapsed. Where intermediary institutions sustained adversarial challenge, user-aligned agency proved more durable; where proprietary infrastructure and closed standard-setting absorbed contestation, displacement compounded. We apply this to agentic AI, where governance arrangements consolidating around the Model Context Protocol and the Agentic AI Foundation are settling these configurations before the choices that define what agents can do move outside the reach of users and the public.