The Language You Ask In: Language-Conditioned Ideological Divergence in LLM Analysis of Contested Political Documents

People increasingly turn to AI chatbots for news and explanations of world events. But do they receive the same political answers when they ask in different languages? Here we show that the language of a question can change how the same AI systems assess the war in Ukraine. We ask GPT, Claude and Gemini to evaluate twenty statements about the war in 112 languages, collecting 67,200 responses. The balance between Russia-leaning and Ukraine-leaning responses differs across languages. When we group responses by countries' official languages, they follow a pattern resembling worldwide political divisions: relatively more Russia-leaning answers correspond to more favourable public views of Russia, less support for Ukraine in United Nations votes, and less aid to Ukraine. The broad pattern recurs across all three models and remains when individual statement pairs are removed. Our findings suggest a possible route through which information warfare may shape the text used to train AI models, which may in turn spread geopolitical biases.

It has generally been assumed that geopolitical bias in language models originates from the training data used during the pre-training phase. We tested seven open-weight LLM pairs consisting of the base model (pre-training only) and the chat model (pre-training and post-training) from seven labs on a paired-scenario forced-choice probe over 28 country pairs in English, French, and Chinese, and found that geopolitical bias originates in post-training rather than in pre-training. Across seven AI labs, six showed shifts in the direction associated with the country or region of the model developer after post-training. This shift is strongest in Alibaba's Qwen 2.5: while the base is neutral on China-favourability (-0.15 log-odds, p=0.15), the post-trained chat variant is at +2.91 (p<10^-4), an 18x shift in odds. We also observe shifts in biases toward other countries across all models. Additionally, the magnitude of this shift depends on the language used to prompt the model: the French-made Mistral becomes pro-France only under French prompting (FR-EN shift +1.91, p<10^-4). These findings suggest that geopolitical preferences in language models are not simply inherited from large-scale internet data but are actively shaped during post-training, highlighting the need for greater transparency, auditing, and oversight of alignment processes that influence how models represent nations, cultures, and political perspectives.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for translation tasks, yet their implicit political positioning in such contexts remains understudied. We ask whether a single politically charged framing term, such as aggressor, enemy, neighbour, or coloniser is sufficient to trigger implicit political alignment in an otherwise apolitical task. We present a fully crossed factorial study in which eight models spanning Western, Chinese, and European origins are prompted to translate culturally attributed recipes into a target language left deliberately unspecified. Across 17 languages, four framing conditions, eight models, and 15,680 responses, we find that models do not simply decline or ask for clarification but resolve the ambiguity. Language resolution and reasoning behavior cluster meaningfully along model families: Western models hedge and deflect with vague justifications, Chinese models resolve conflicts silently, and Mistral Large emerges as a distinct profile combining high compliance with conflict-grounded reasoning. Sensitivity to framing terms is consistent across models: even subtle framing variation is sufficient to modulate behavior. Our findings urge caution when deploying LLMs for translation in conflict-adjacent contexts, where implicit political judgments may be made without any signal to the user.