cs.CLFeb 8, 2026

Thinking Is Not Telling: Information Disclosure in User-Service LLM Agents

Authors: Jiatong Li, Changdae Oh, Hyeong Kyu Choi, Jindong Wang, Sharon Li

Organizations: University of Wisconsin–Madison · William & Mary

Abstract

User-engaged LLM agents increasingly operate in service scenarios where task success depends on coordination between the agent, the user, and a stateful environment. In such interactions, the agent often has access to rich information that the user does not observe, such as task policies, tool results, and environment states. This makes agent-user communication a central component of task completion. In this work, we study a communication-level failure mode of user-service agents: internal reasoning is counterproductive for the interactive information disclosure. We introduce information disclosure as a measurable communication mechanism, covering state corrections, available options, constraints, consequences, and proactively retrieved environment information. Motivated by recent advances in LLM reasoning, we evaluate and analyse information disclosure under a controlled setting of agents equipped with a "think" tool, which allows agents to reason internally before responding or acting. Across five models and three user-service scenarios, we first show that enforced thinking has unstable utility. We then analyse response scaling under different think efforts and find that more thinking does not reliably translate into richer information disclosure. Using turn-level counterfactual intervention, we show that injecting golden decision-relevant information significantly intervenes agents to correct action trajectories, indicating that missing disclosure can causally affect the agent's immediate downstream behaviour. We further find that failed trajectories most often lack state corrections and constraints, and that a lightweight disclosure-aware prompt effectively mitigates degradation. These results suggest that the key challenge is not simply making agents think more, but ensuring that reasoning and information are externalised as timely information disclosure.

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