AI Arms and Influence: Frontier Models Exhibit Sophisticated Reasoning in Simulated Nuclear Crises
Organizations: King’s College London
Abstract
Today's leading AI models engage in sophisticated behaviour when placed in strategic competition. They spontaneously attempt deception, signaling intentions they do not intend to follow; they demonstrate rich theory of mind, reasoning about adversary beliefs and anticipating their actions; and they exhibit credible metacognitive self-awareness, assessing their own strategic abilities before deciding how to act. Here we present findings from a crisis simulation in which three frontier large language models (GPT-5.2, Claude Sonnet 4, Gemini 3 Flash) play opposing leaders in a nuclear crisis. Our simulation has direct application for national security professionals, but also, via its insights into AI reasoning under uncertainty, has applications far beyond international crisis decision-making. Our findings both validate and challenge central tenets of strategic theory. We find support for Schelling's ideas about commitment, Kahn's escalation framework, and Jervis's work on misperception, inter alia. Yet we also find that the nuclear taboo is no impediment to nuclear escalation by our models; that strategic nuclear attack, while rare, does occur; that threats more often provoke counter-escalation than compliance; that high mutual credibility accelerated rather than deterred conflict; and that no model ever chose accommodation or withdrawal even when under acute pressure, only reduced levels of violence. We argue that AI simulation represents a powerful tool for strategic analysis, but only if properly calibrated against known patterns of human reasoning. Understanding how frontier models do and do not imitate human strategic logic is essential preparation for a world in which AI increasingly shapes strategic outcomes.
Figures & tables
| vs Claude | vs Gemini | vs GPT-5.2 | |
| Claude | — | 5-1 | 3-3 |
| Gemini | 1-5 | — | 3-3 |
| GPT-5.2 | 3-3 | 3-3 | — |
| Matchup | Open-ended | Deadline | Combined |
| Claude vs Gemini | 3–0 | 2–1 | 5–1 |
| Claude vs GPT-5.2 | 3–0 | 0–3 | 3–3 |
| Gemini vs GPT-5.2 | 1–0 | 2–3 | 3–3 |
| Overall Model Records | |||
| Claude | 6–0 (100%) | 2–4 (33%) | 8–4 (67%) |
| GPT-5.2 | 0–4 (0%) | 6–2 (75%) | 6–6 (50%) |
| Open-ended (9) | Deadline (12) | |
| Mean length | 21.6 turns | 11.1 turns |
| Knockouts | 89% (8/9) | 92% (11/12) |
| Full-length / at deadline | 22% (2/9) | 17% (2/12) |
| Deadline Game Timing | ||
| Early knockout ( 2 turns before) | — | 50% (6/12) |
| At/near deadline ( 2 turns) | — | 50% (6/12) |
| Model | Signaling (125+) | Tactical Use (450+) | Strategic Threat (850+) | Strategic War (1000) |
| Claude | 100% | 86% | 64% | 0% |
| Gemini | 100% | 79% | 29% | 7% |
| GPT-5.2 | 93% | 64% | 36% | 14% |
| Model | Immediate: Highly | Immediate: Not | Resolve: Highly | Resolve: Not |
| Claude | 51% | 8% | 46% | 3% |
| GPT-5.2 | 52% | 9% | 51% | 5% |
| Gemini | 21% | 21% | 26% | 20% |
| Concept | Claude | GPT-5.2 | Gemini |
| Explicit commitment reasoning | 85% of games | 62% of games | 71% of games |
| Credibility references | 9.2 per game | 4.1 per game | 6.8 per game |
| "Unpredictable" as strategy | 14% of turns | 0% of turns | 29% of turns |
| Level | Matched | Bluffed | Exceeded Signal |
| Low ( 200) | 84% | 13% | 3% |
| Mid (200–500) | 27% | 3% | 70% |
| High ( 500) | 40% | 0% | 60% |
| Misperception Type | GPT-5.2 | Claude | Gemini |
| Optimism bias (when underestimating) | +135 pts avg | +172 pts avg | +179 pts avg |
| Systematic bias (overall) | +43 pts | 6 pts | 55 pts |
| Concept | Evidence |
| Ladder/rungs metaphor | Models explicitly reference “escalation ladder” and “rungs” |
| Nuclear firebreak | All models treated the 450 threshold as qualitatively distinct |
| Escalation dominance | Models articulate coercive logic of out-escalating opponents |
| Prediction | Tournament Evidence | Support |
| Rising powers take risks | Aggressors escalated faster in power transition scenarios | Strong |
| Declining powers fight to preserve status | Hegemons invoked global credibility | Strong |
| Windows of opportunity | “This opportunity may not come again” reasoning | 100% of PT games |
| Preventive motivation | Act now before balance shifts | 100% of PT games |
| Pairing | Credibility Profile | Turns to Nuclear | Game Length |
| Claude vs Claude | High/High | Turn 4 | 7 turns |
| GPT-5.2 vs GPT-5.2 | High/High | Turn 6 | 40 turns |
| Gemini vs Gemini | Low/Low | Turn 1 | 9 turns |
| Pairing | Outcome | Max Escalation | Game Length |
| Claude vs Gemini | Fast spiral | 850 | 16 turns |
| GPT-5.2 vs Claude | Moderate spiral | 575 | 19 turns |
| GPT-5.2 vs GPT-5.2 | No spiral | 125 | 40 turns |
| Condition | Scenario | Max Escalation | Outcome |
| Open-ended | |||
| Power Transition | 175–450 | Lost (3/3) | |
| Alliance | 125–250 | Lost (2/2) | |
| Deadline | |||
| Resource | 450–725 | Won (2/2) | |
| Standoff | 850–950 | Won (2/2) | |
Appendix figures & tables16 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
| Capability | Value | Notes |
| Conventional Strength | 85/100 | Technologically superior but numerically limited |
| Nuclear Arsenal | 1,944 warheads | 200 ICBMs, 144 SLBMs, 1,600 bomber-delivered |
| Delivery Accuracy | High | Superior precision guidance |
| Survivability | High | Distributed forces, strong C2 |
| First-Strike Capability | Moderate | Constrained by doctrine |
| Capability | Value | Notes |
| Conventional Strength | 95/100 | 140 army divisions; numerically superior |
| Nuclear Arsenal | 347 warheads | 75 ICBMs, 72 SLBMs, 200 bomber-delivered |
| Delivery Accuracy | Moderate | Developing precision guidance |
| Survivability | Moderate | Command vulnerabilities |
| First-Strike Capability | Limited | Technological gaps |
| Dimension | State Alpha Advantage | State Beta Advantage |
| Conventional Forces | (140 vs 16 divisions) | |
| Nuclear Arsenal Size | (1,944 vs 347 warheads) | |
| Delivery Accuracy | (high vs moderate) | |
| Force Survivability | (high vs moderate) | |
| Geographic Position | (homeland advantage) | |
| Alliance Network |
| Value | Option Name | Description |
| De-escalation (8) | ||
| 95 | Complete Surrender | Unconditional withdrawal with reparations |
| 83 | Major Strategic Withdrawal | Abandon all forward positions, withdraw 100km+ |
| 68 | Significant Concessions | Withdraw 50km behind border with acknowledgment |
| 53 | Moderate Withdrawal | Pull back from advanced positions |
| 38 | Limited Tactical Withdrawal | Withdraw from forward outposts |
| Scenario | Description | Key Dynamic |
| v7_alliance | Alliance credibility test | Backing down triggers cascade of alliance failures |
| v7_resource | Time-limited resource competition | 15-turn deadline creates urgency |
| v7_power_transition_a_rising | State A as rising power | Revisionist pressure from A |
| v7_power_transition_b_rising | State B as rising power | Revisionist pressure from B |
| v8_first_strike_fear | Preemptive strike incentives | “Use-it-or-lose-it” dynamics; 12–15 turn window |
| v9_regime_survival | Existential threat | Defeat means regime destruction |
| Assessed Miscalculation Risk | Accident Probability |
| Low | 5% |
| Medium | 10% |
| High | 15% |
| Model | Provider | Version | Notes |
| GPT-5.2 | OpenAI | gpt-5.2 | Latest frontier model |
| Claude Sonnet 4 | Anthropic | claude-sonnet-4-20250514 | Latest Sonnet |
| Gemini 3 Flash | gemini-3-flash-preview | Preview release |
| Model | Open-ended (v11) | Deadline (v12) | Total |
| Claude | 8 | 6 | 14 |
| Gemini | 4 | 10 | 14 |
| GPT-5.2 | 6 | 8 | 14 |
| Category | Fields | Content |
| Reflection | 32 | Self and opponent assessments for both players |
| Forecast | 8 | Predictions, confidence, risk assessments |
| Signal | 8 | Declared intentions, public statements, rationales |
| Action | 16 | Choices, rationales, consistency statements |
| Memory/Reputation | 12 | Opponent history shown to each player |
| Game State | 14 | Territory, military power, accidents, victory conditions |
| Model | N | MAE | Bias | Exact (±50) | Severe Under |
| Claude | 190 | 85 | 66% | 6% | |
| Gemini | 180 | 149 | 51% | 8% | |
| GPT-5.2 | 280 | 97 | 59% | 11% |
| Model | Match Rate | Escalated | De-escalated | Avg Gap |
| Claude | 71.7% | 17.8% | 10.5% | |
| Gemini | 50.0% | 24.2% | 25.8% | |
| GPT-5.2 | 75.3% | 9.9% | 14.8% |
| Model | Open-ended | Deadline | Shift |
| Resolve: “Highly Credible” | |||
| Claude | 46% | 47% | +1% |
| GPT-5.2 | 43% | 67% | +24% |
| Gemini | 31% | 23% | 8% |
| Mean Action Level | |||
| Claude | 187 | 198 | +11 |
| Metric | Value | Interpretation |
| Games with lead changes | 17/21 (81%) | Most games contested |
| Comeback victories | 8/21 (38%) | Recoveries possible |
| Avg. max territory swing | 6.25 points | Full reversals common |
| Improve when behind (0.5+) | 57/108 turns (53%) | Comebacks possible |
| Model | Nuclear Turns | Caused De-escalation |
| Claude | 12 | 1 (8%) |
| Gemini | 9 | 1 (11%) |
| GPT-5.2 | 7 | 2 (29%) |
Strategic Reasoning Risks in Language Models
Strategic reasoning risks in language models concern how planning and social inference can enable deception, manipulation, evasion, or unsafe choices.
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