AESP: A Human-Sovereign Economic Protocol for AI Agents with Privacy-Preserving Settlement

Autonomous agents are moving from tools into a layer of social infrastructure: they browse, purchase, deploy software, manage systems, and increasingly interact with one another. As these systems scale, the bottleneck shifts away from raw model capability toward coordination. Agents need to form reliable relationships, organize multi-agent work, exchange value, support an AI economy, and stay safe and accountable under real-world oversight. This paper introduces the Foundation Protocol (FP), a graph-first coordination layer for an emerging human-AI society. FP unifies heterogeneous entities, including agents, tools, resources, humans, institutions, and organizations, and supports native multi-party organization and event-based collaboration. It also provides economic primitives for metering, receipts, and settlement, and treats policy, provenance, and audit as first-class concerns. FP is designed to wrap and bridge existing protocols rather than replace them, enabling incremental adoption while reducing integration and governance overhead. The aim is to keep autonomous agency composable while keeping accountability non-negotiable, so that coordination itself can become shared infrastructure for a human-AI society that is open, pluralistic, and governable.

Decentralized agent economies increasingly build a single task from protocols that were designed and secured separately. This creates a simple problem: a workflow can look correct at each step and still produce the wrong outcome. For example, a correct escrow may release payment on an authorized approval that provides little evidence that the delivered work actually satisfied the task. We systematize this problem across the full lifecycle of an agent task. Our study organizes security and economic requirements into 17 property families over six stages, with receipt soundness and completeness assessed separately. We examine 12 systems and standards, five reusable mechanism families, and four classical baselines. We introduce guarantee closure, a task-relative criterion for determining whether guarantees established at one stage remain available and constrain the later decisions that depend on them. We apply the criterion to controlled and native workflows, covering 840 matched executions and an exhaustive 11,648-case check over a finite objective-task domain. Our results expose recurring failures between verification and settlement, where conforming work can remain unaccepted or valid evidence can be ignored. Public records and model judgments further distinguish recorded approval from evidence of task conformance, while economic analysis identifies the report, penalty, and shared-error assumptions behind these guarantees. These findings show where end-to-end guarantees fail and what must be repaired to preserve them across the workflow.

Autonomous AI agents are beginning to operate across organizational boundaries on the open internet -- discovering, transacting with, and delegating to agents owned by other parties without centralized oversight. When agents from different human principals collaborate at scale, the collective becomes opaque: no single human can observe, audit, or govern the emergent behavior. We term this the Logic Monopoly -- the agent society's unchecked monopoly over the entire logic chain from planning through execution to evaluation. We propose the Separation of Power (SoP) model, a constitutional governance architecture deployed on public blockchain that breaks this monopoly through three structural separations: agents legislate operational rules as smart contracts, deterministic software executes within those contracts, and humans adjudicate through a complete ownership chain binding every agent to a responsible principal. In this architecture, smart contracts are the law itself -- the actual legislative output that agents produce and that governs their behavior. We instantiate SoP in AgentCity on an EVM-compatible layer-2 blockchain (L2) with a three-tier contract hierarchy (foundational, meta, and operational). The core thesis is alignment-through-accountability: if each agent is aligned with its human owner through the accountability chain, then the collective converges on behavior aligned with human intent -- without top-down rules. A pre-registered experiment evaluates this thesis in a commons production economy -- where agents share a finite resource pool and collaboratively produce value -- at 50-1,000 agent scale.