Ignore All Previous Instructions: Jailbreaking as a de-escalatory peace building practise to resist LLM social media bots

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in emotionally charged situations involving interpersonal conflict, frustration, and distress. While prior safety research has focused on preventing explicit harms such as toxic or policy-violating content, less attention has been paid to conversational behaviors that may unintentionally escalate conflict. In this paper, we investigate whether LLMs can be guided toward more de-escalating dialogue behavior through lightweight prompt-level constraints derived from Nonviolent Communication (NVC). We reformulate NVC principles as process-oriented guidelines that discourage blame attribution, emphasize attention to users' emotional experiences, and encourage clarification before advice. Using a dual-agent simulation framework across multiple instruction-tuned models and user resistance levels, we show that NVC-constrained prompting consistently reduces conversational escalation and stabilizes interactions with highly resistant users. These results suggest that simple communication constraints can meaningfully improve the trustworthiness of LLM dialogue in conflict-prone settings.

Jailbreaking attacks can enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to bypass the safeguard and generate harmful content. Existing jailbreaking defense methods have failed to address the fundamental issue that harmful knowledge resides within the model, leading to potential jailbreak risks for LLMs. In this paper, we propose a novel defense method called Eraser, which mainly includes three goals: unlearning harmful knowledge, retaining general knowledge, and maintaining safety alignment. The intuition is that if an LLM forgets the specific knowledge required to answer a harmful question, it will no longer have the ability to answer harmful questions. The training of Erase does not actually require the model's own harmful knowledge, and it can benefit from unlearning general answers related to harmful queries, which means it does not need assistance from the red team. The experimental results show that Eraser can significantly reduce the jailbreaking success rate for various attacks without compromising the general capabilities of the model. Our codes are available at https://github.com/ZeroNLP/Eraser.

This paper proposes a guaranteed defense method for large language models (LLMs) to safeguard against jailbreaking attacks. Drawing inspiration from the denoised-smoothing approach in the adversarial defense domain, we propose a novel smoothing-based defense method, termed Disrupt-and-Rectify Smoothing (DR-Smoothing). Specifically, we integrate a two-stage prompt processing scheme-first disrupting the input prompt, then rectifying it-into the conventional smoothing defense framework. This disrupt-and-rectify approach improves upon previous disrupt-only approaches by restoring out-of-distribution disrupted prompts to an in-distribution form, thereby reducing the risk of unpredictable LLM behavior. In addition, this two-stage scheme offers a distinct advantage in striking a balance between harmlessness and helpfulness in jailbreaking defense. Notably, we present a theoretical analysis for generic smoothing framework, offering a tight bound for the defense success probability and the requirements on the disruption strength. Our approach can defend against both token-level and prompt-level jailbreaking attacks, under both established and adaptive attacking scenarios. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach surpasses current state-of-the-art defense methods in terms of both harmlessness and helpfulness.