Bayesian Adversarial Privacy

With AI systems gaining more access to individuals' information, it is important to protect privacy when reporting statistical answers. Equally important is to privatize the reporting of uncertainty in such answers. To this end, we adopt a Bayesian likelihood-free framework and make simulation from the posterior private. In particular, we propose a new private instantiation of the Bayesian bootstrap using a blocking strategy. Rather than assigning idiosyncratic random weights to each individual, we randomly group individuals and assign a single weight to each group. By concealing individuals' contributions within a group, we fortify differential privacy gates. We harness amortized inference that decouples private learning from posterior sampling. A push-forward map from observation weights to posterior samples is learned privately by adding calibrated noise during training. Subsequent posterior draws require no additional privacy and computation budget. We call the resulting method the Private Generative Bayesian Bootstrap (PGBB). We establish a differential privacy guarantee, analyze convergence to the non-private blocked-bootstrap target, and quantify the discrepancy between the ordinary and blocked Bayesian-bootstrap posteriors. In addition, we derive data-free tuning of the block Dirichlet concentration parameter that restores posterior dispersion asymptotically. We also show a single fit of PGBB can support a family of loss-based decision rules simultaneously without additional privacy cost. In simulations and in applications to U.S. Census returns to schooling and U.S. natality birthweight quantiles, PGBB gives competitive private uncertainty quantification and improves over private Bayesian alternatives that require a specified data-generating model in common settings.

Targeted advertising systems can pair audiences selected by advertisers with ad units that expose visible user actions. When an interaction remains linked to the campaign that elicited it, the advertiser may receive an observation tied to a user rather than only an aggregate report. We model that channel as a noisy oracle for attribute inference. The model separates targeting predicates, exposure, interaction, and disclosure. These boundaries capture the gap between eligibility and delivery, and the gap between interaction and advertiser visibility. We build a reproducible benchmark using synthetic populations calibrated with public data, each with known sensitive labels. A generated campaign semantics layer provides topic variants and response priors. The simulator generates the ground truth, event traces, disclosed observations, and metrics. The evaluation compares Bayesian, supervised, positive and unlabeled, and adaptive attacks under common campaign and disclosure definitions. The final evaluation uses four topic variants, seven simulator seeds, and two interaction settings. Repeated campaigns with identity exposure produce measurable but bounded inference signal. At $160$ campaigns, Bayesian and supervised attacks reach about $0.64$ AUC in the main setting and about $0.65$ AUC in the higher interaction setting. Disclosure policy is the strongest control. Aggregate reporting removes the evaluated oracle input tied to users. Type filtering and randomized disclosure reduce the released signal. The result is a model, artifact, and defense evaluation method for privacy in interactive targeted advertising. The code is available at https://github.com/P-HOW/Interactive-Ad-Oracle.

We propose a collaborative meta-learning framework for distributed Bayesian optimization matching centralized performance without raw-data exchange. We show gradient sharing leaks client observations, with leakage worsening as the search converges and queries concentrate near the optimum. We evaluate a differentially private defense and characterize its privacy-utility trade-off.