Large Language Models as Bidding Agents in Repeated HetNet Auction

Efficient and fair spectrum allocation is a central challenge in 6G networks, where massive connectivity and heterogeneous services continuously compete for limited radio resources. We investigate the use of Large Language Models (LLMs) as bidding agents in repeated 6G spectrum auctions with budget constraints in vehicular networks. Each user equipment (UE) acts as a rational player optimizing its long-term utility through repeated interactions. Using the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism as a benchmark for incentive-compatible, dominant-strategy truthfulness, we compare LLM-guided bidding against truthful and heuristic strategies. Unlike heuristics, LLMs leverage historical outcomes and prompt-based reasoning to adapt their bidding behavior dynamically. Results show that when the theoretical assumptions guaranteeing truthfulness hold, LLM bidders recover near-equilibrium outcomes consistent with VCG predictions. However, when these assumptions break -- such as under static budget constraints -- LLMs sustain longer participation and achieve higher utilities, revealing their ability to approximate adaptive equilibria beyond static mechanism design. This work provides the first systematic evaluation of LLM bidders in repeated spectrum auctions, offering new insights into how AI-driven agents can interact strategically and reshape market dynamics in future 6G networks.

We study the allocation of reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs) in a multi-cell wireless network, where base stations compete for control of shared RIS units deployed at the cell edges. These RISs, provided by an independent operator, are dynamically leased to the highest bidder using a simultaneously ascending auction format. Each base station estimates the utility of acquiring additional RISs based on macroscopic channel parameters, enabling a scalable and low-overhead allocation mechanism. To optimize the bidding behavior, we integrate deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agents that learn to maximize performance while adhering to budget constraints. Through simulations in clustered cell-edge environments, we demonstrate that reinforcement learning (RL)-based bidding significantly outperforms heuristic strategies, achieving optimal trade-offs between cost and spectral efficiency. Furthermore, we introduce a tunable parameter that governs the bidding aggressiveness of RL agents, enabling a flexible control of the trade-off between network performance and expenditure. Our results highlight the potential of combining auction-based allocation with adaptive RL mechanisms for efficient and fair utilization of RISs in next-generation wireless networks.

We present a telecom-native auction mechanism for allocating bandwidth and time slots across heterogeneous-delay networks, ranging from low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite constellations to delay-tolerant deep-space relays. The Lorentz-Invariant Auction (LIA) treats bids as spacetime events and reweights reported values based on the horizon slack, a causal quantity derived from the earliest-arrival times relative to a public clearing horizon. Unlike other delay-equalization rules, LIA combines a causal-ordering formulation, a uniquely exponential slack correction implied by a semigroup-style invariance axiom, and a critical-value implementation that ensures truthful reported values once slacks are fixed by trusted infrastructure. We analyze the incentive result in the exogenous-slack regime and separately examine bounded slack-estimation error and endogenous-delay limitations. Under fixed feasible slacks, LIA is individually rational and achieves welfare at least $e^{-λΔ}$ relative to the optimal feasible allocation, where $Δ$ is the slack spread. We evaluate LIA on STARLINK-200, INTERNET-100, and DSN-30 across 52,500 baseline instances with market sizes $n\in\{10,20,30,40,50\}$ and conduct additional robustness sweeps. On Starlink and Internet, LIA maintains near-efficiency while eliminating measured timing rents. However, on DSN, welfare is lower in thin markets but improves with depth. We also distinguish winner-determination time from the background cost of maintaining slack estimates and study robustness beyond independent and identically distributed (iid) noise through error-spread bounds and structured (distance-biased and subnetwork-correlated) noise models. These results suggest that causal-consistent mechanism design offers a practical non-buffering alternative to synchronized delay equalization in heterogeneous telecom infrastructures.