Organizations: Department of Electronics and Electrical Engineering, Keio University · Department of Information Technology and Human Factors, the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
LiDAR SLAM provides high-accuracy localization but is fragile to point-cloud corruption because scan matching assumes geometric consistency. Prior physical attacks on LiDAR SLAM largely rely on LiDAR spoofing via external signal injection, which requires sensor-specific timing knowledge and is increasingly mitigated by modern defense mechanisms such as timing obfuscation and injection rejection. In this work, we show that specular reflection offers an injection-free alternative and demonstrate an attack, MirrorDrift, that uses an actuated planar mirror to cause ghost points in LiDAR scans and systematically bias scan-matching correspondences. MirrorDrift optimizes mirror placement, alignment, and actuation. In simulation, it increases the average pose error (APE) by 6.1x over random placement, degrading three SLAM systems to 2.29-3.31 m mean APE. In real-world experiments on a modern LiDAR with state-of-the-art interference mitigation, it induces localization errors of up to 6.03 m. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first successful SLAM-targeted attack against production-grade secure LiDARs.
Figures & tables
Fig. 1: Real-world MirrorDrift demonstration. The reference trajectory (white dashed) and the attacked trajectories estimated by KISS-ICP [ 4 ] , FAST-LIO2 [ 5 ] , and GLIM [ 6 ] (red/green/orange) show large deviations in the positive y -direction under attack.
LiDAR model
VLP-32c
Horizon
HAP
AT-128
Appearance
Release (Year)
2017
2020
2020
2022
Channels (lines)
32
∼ 48
∼ 64
128
Interference Mitigation
–
✓
✓
✓
Nagata et al. [ 2 ]
Real-world
✓
–
–
–
TABLE I: Comparison of attack feasibility against LiDAR models.
Fig. 2: (a) Overview of MirrorDrift . We optimize the mirror placement and orientation and determine its motion pattern. The mirror position and nominal orientation are optimized by maximizing the objective function defined in § III-C . To induce false point-to-point correspondences across frames, the mirror is periodically oscillated in the yaw direction. (b) Threat model overview. The adversary aims to deceive the victim vehicle’s ego-localization using mirror-induced ghost points and to cause deviations from the intended route. The mirror is placed in the environment, alongside the robot’s traveling route. The victim route is assumed to be known, allowing the adversary to pre-optimize the mirror placement and orientation using MirrorDrift .
Fig. 3: Mirror-induced ghost point behavior under mirror angle changes. When the mirror rotates by Δθ , the reflection direction changes by 2Δθ according to the law of reflection. As a result, a ghost point at range r undergoes an inter-frame displacement of 2rsin(Δθ) .
Fig. 4: Attack device and its effect on LiDAR measurements. (Left) Implemented mirror-actuation device consisting of a planar mirror mounted on a fixture and driven by a Dynamixel MX-28 servo motor to vary the mirror yaw angle over time. (Right) Comparison of LiDAR point clouds captured without the mirror (w/o attack device) and with the mirror present and actuated (w/ attack device).
Fig. 5: Mirror simulation results. The reference point cloud is plotted in yellow-green, and the simulated point cloud is overlaid in red. The two point clouds closely overlap, yielding a very small Chamfer Distance of 0.028176 m.
Fig. 6: Experimental environment used in our evaluation. The Start location in the upper-left is set as the origin, and the platform moves toward the Goal location in the lower-right, proceeding in the positive x and negative y directions.
SLAM algorithms
APE (no mirror)
APE (random)
APE (Optimized, ours)
Head. (no mirror)
Head. (random)
Head. (Optimized, ours)
KISS-ICP [ 4 ]
0.064±0.080
0.429±0.288
3.305 ± 0.047
0.277±0.346
0.237±0.166
9.700 ± 0.516
FAST-LIO2 [ 5 ]
0.198±0.159
0.425±0.235
2.292 ± 0.019
0.710±0.240
2.387±1.686
6.462 ± 0.078
GLIM [ 6 ]
0.213±0.146
0.551±0.737
2.900 ± 0.141
1.454±0.626
2.960±4.150
8.081 ± 0.784
TABLE III: Simulation results. Unit: meter / degree.
SLAM algorithms
Occl.+Refl.
Occl.
Refl.
KISS-ICP [ 4 ]
3.305 ± 0.047
0.188±0.022
3.259±0.026
FAST-LIO2 [ 5 ]
2.292 ± 0.019
0.237±0.008
2.237±0.220
GLIM [ 6 ]
2.900 ± 0.141
0.128±0.045
2.292±0.617
TABLE IV: Ablation study results. Metric is APE.(simulation)
Fig. 7: Relationship between the mirror–trajectory distance and attack effectiveness (APE). As the distance between the mirror and the trajectory increases, the number of mirror-induced ghost points and the resulting APE decrease.
Fig. 8: (Upper) Estimated trajectories across 100 trials with stochastic placement noise ( ±0.5 m for x,y and ±5∘ for yaw). (Lower)APE heatmap over mirror pose (x,y,yaw) (FAST-LIO2). Sustained errors across the noise range demonstrate the attack’s robustness, showing that coarse placement within the LiDAR’s FoV suffices without cm-level precision.
Fig. 9: Real-world experimental setup. (a) Mirror in the experimental environment (planar mirror, 1.6,m×0.8,m ), manually oscillated in yaw. (b) Victim vehicle (electric wheelchair) with sensors. (c) Sensor system: Hesai AT128 LiDAR and an external IMU (WT-901C).
In this work, we introduce Dynamic SLAMSpoof (D-SLAMSpoof), a novel attack that compromises LiDAR SLAM even in feature-rich environments. The attack leverages LiDAR spoofing, which injects spurious measurements into LiDAR scans through external laser interference. By designing both spatial injection shapes and temporally coordinated dynamic injection patterns guided by scan-matching principles, D-SLAMSpoof significantly improves attack success rates in real-world, feature-rich environments such as urban areas and indoor spaces, where conventional LiDAR spoofing methods often fail. Furthermore, we propose a practical defense method, ISD-SLAM, that relies solely on inertial dead reckoning signals commonly available in autonomous systems. We demonstrate that ISD-SLAM accurately detects LiDAR spoofing attacks, including D-SLAMSpoof, and effectively mitigates the resulting position drift. Our findings expose inherent vulnerabilities in LiDAR-based SLAM and introduce the first practical defense against LiDAR-based SLAM spoofing using only standard onboard sensors, providing critical insights for improving the security and reliability of autonomous systems.
Rokuto Nagata, Kenji Koide, Kazuma Ikeda +2
Department of Electronics and Electrical Engineering, Keio University · Department of Information Technology and Human Factors, the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology
Autonomous driving perception is typically evaluated on clean benchmark data, yet real-world deployment requires robustness to rare, structured, and potentially adversarial sensor anomalies. This gap is especially critical for LiDAR, where external actors can physically manipulate the sensing process to induce black-box perception failures without accessing the model. Existing LiDAR benchmarks provide little visibility into this failure mode. Prior adversarial LiDAR studies have largely centered on attack hardware, geometric and algorithmic defenses, and early-generation detectors, leaving the robustness of modern perception systems unexplored. To address this evaluation gap, we introduce ATLAS (Adversarial Temporal LiDAR Attack Suite), the first large-scale, physically grounded evaluation benchmark for LiDAR perception models under black-box sensor attacks, simulating the two primary attack modes -- point injection and point removal -- across real driving sequences. Evaluating a broad cross-section of current state-of-the-art LiDAR perception models, ATLAS reveals a surprising robustness asymmetry: models with stronger performance on standard benchmarks tend to better withstand removal attacks, yet are actually more vulnerable to injection attacks than weaker models. We trace this vulnerability to standard object database sampling augmentations, revealing how current training practices can induce architecture-agnostic robustness failures, and study initial directions for mitigating both attack modes. We release the ATLAS generation code to support extensible, reproducible evaluations as attack capabilities evolve, helping make black-box sensor robustness an explicit consideration in future LiDAR perception development.
Geometric light detection and ranging (LiDAR)--inertial simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM) provides efficient state estimation but lacks the continuous map representation and global refinement capabilities of neural implicit SLAM, while neural implicit methods remain computationally expensive. We propose Lightweight LiDAR--Inertial Neural SLAM (LIN-SLAM), a hybrid method that couples high-rate geometric LiDAR--inertial estimation with neural implicit tracking, continual mapping, and global refinement for accurate real-time onboard SLAM. Experiments on twelve representative sequences from three datasets spanning 32-, 64-, and 128-channel LiDAR configurations show that LIN-SLAM achieves the lowest overall mean absolute trajectory error (ATE) among the evaluated state-of-the-art geometric and neural implicit methods, while substantially reducing runtime compared with existing neural implicit SLAM methods. On a Unitree Go2 equipped with an NVIDIA Jetson Orin NX and a 16-channel LiDAR, LIN-SLAM sustains real-time localization and neural mapping over a 1.47-km indoor trajectory through challenging repetitive corridor environments, with an endpoint closure error of only 0.141~m. To the best of our knowledge, LIN-SLAM is the first LiDAR--inertial SLAM system with a neural implicit backend to achieve real-time online operation on a mobile robotic platform while maintaining state-of-the-art localization accuracy. The code will be released upon acceptance.
Shiqi Che, Yijie Liu, Shuo Wang +1
School of Automation Science and Electrical Engineering, Beihang University, Beijing 100191, China