cs.ROMar 11, 2026

MirrorDrift: Actuated Mirror-Based Attacks on LiDAR SLAM

Authors: Rokuto Nagata, Kenji Koide, Kazuma Ikeda, Ozora Sako, Shion Horie, Kentaro Yoshioka

Organizations: Department of Electronics and Electrical Engineering, Keio University · Department of Information Technology and Human Factors, the National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology

Abstract

LiDAR SLAM provides high-accuracy localization but is fragile to point-cloud corruption because scan matching assumes geometric consistency. Prior physical attacks on LiDAR SLAM largely rely on LiDAR spoofing via external signal injection, which requires sensor-specific timing knowledge and is increasingly mitigated by modern defense mechanisms such as timing obfuscation and injection rejection. In this work, we show that specular reflection offers an injection-free alternative and demonstrate an attack, MirrorDrift, that uses an actuated planar mirror to cause ghost points in LiDAR scans and systematically bias scan-matching correspondences. MirrorDrift optimizes mirror placement, alignment, and actuation. In simulation, it increases the average pose error (APE) by 6.1x over random placement, degrading three SLAM systems to 2.29-3.31 m mean APE. In real-world experiments on a modern LiDAR with state-of-the-art interference mitigation, it induces localization errors of up to 6.03 m. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first successful SLAM-targeted attack against production-grade secure LiDARs.

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