Exploiting Expertise of Non-Expert and Diverse Agents in Social Bandit Learning: A Free Energy Approach

We study multi-objective multi-agent multi-armed bandits (MO-MA-MAB) under stochastic rewards, where agents observe heterogeneous reward vectors and communicate over time-varying graphs. We formulate this emerging problem setting to address efficient learning, measured by Pareto regret, and incorporate fair learning as an additional goal, captured via social welfare. To measure efficiency, we formulate Pareto regret and develop Pareto UCB1 Gossip, whose novel exploration radius explicitly separates statistical uncertainty in Pareto-based inference from consensus error. To express the fairness constraint, we formulate a Nash Social Welfare objective over preference-scalarized rewards and propose Simulated NSW UCB Gossip, which integrates preference-based reward simulation, gossip-based utility estimation, and UCB-style exploration. We prove that Pareto UCB1 Gossip achieves $\mathcal{O}(\log T)$ regret and an instance-independent rate of $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})$, while Simulated NSW UCB Gossip achieves an instance-independent regret bound of $\mathcal{O}(T^{3/4})$. This separation reveals the cost of imposing the fairness constraint to our efficiency objective: fairness limits information aggregation and slows convergence. Experiments show that our methods consistently outperform baselines, improving performance by approximately $100\%$ and $50\%$ in the efficiency and fairness settings, respectively.

Social preferences can promote cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning, but existing approaches often require agents to observe the rewards of their peers. In many real-world interactions, however, an agent can, as humans do, observe others' behavior and outcomes without access to their private reward signals. We introduce self-referenced social preferences, in which each agent learns a model of its own reward, applies it to other agents' observed transitions to assess their outcomes from its own perspective, and feeds these self-referenced assessments into standard social preferences. We study two ways to incorporate these assessments: modifying the learning reward, or using them to weight policy updates. We evaluate the approach on three sequential social dilemmas, Escape Room, Clean Up, and Commons Harvest, which require volunteering, public-good contribution, and resource restraint, respectively. Across all three environments, agents learn cooperative behavior without observing others' rewards, including in settings where independent learners fail to cooperate, and frequently achieve more equitable divisions of jointly produced returns than agents with access to true rewards. The effective integration point depends on the social preference: inequity aversion works best in the reward together with a value look-ahead, whereas a purely benevolent preference benefits from policy-update weighting. Under partial observability, the policy-update approach continues to support cooperation. These results show that explicit access to other agents' reward signals is not necessary for learning cooperative behavior: social preferences can instead be grounded in self-referenced assessments of others' outcomes derived from their observed behavior.

Humans often acquire new skills by observing others, since observed behaviors implicitly reveal how to act in an environment. However, observations drawn from a heterogeneous population introduce conflicting behavioral signals, making it difficult to determine which behaviors are worth imitating. We address this challenge with General Reward Inference and Disentanglement (GRID), a social learning method that extracts universally useful behaviors from a heterogeneous population of demonstrators pursuing different goals. GRID decomposes per-agent reward functions into a general reward, capturing behaviors shared across all agents, and specific rewards, capturing individual preferences and objectives. Training exclusively on the general reward provides a new paradigm of generalist pretraining. It yields a generalist agent that internalizes universal environmental competencies, such as safety and basic task proficiency, without the mode-averaging bias that afflicts standard learning from demonstration techniques. This generalist serves as a superior prior for fine-tuning to downstream tasks, including preferences unseen during training. Experiments across a synthetic basis function decomposition, multi-agent Craftax, and a continuous autonomous driving simulator (Highway-Env) confirm that GRID successfully disentangles reward structure in a semantically meaningful way, outperforms standard learning from demonstration baselines, and enables more efficient and stable specialization.