Organizations: Tsinghua University, Beijing, China · The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, China · Southern University of Science and Technology, Shenzhen, China · Peking University, Beijing, China · The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
Artificial intelligence is increasingly catalyzing scientific automation, with multimodal large language model (MLLM) agents evolving from lab assistants into self-driving lab operators. This transition imposes stringent safety requirements on laboratory environments, where fragile glassware, hazardous substances, and high-precision laboratory equipment render planning errors or misinterpreted risks potentially irreversible. However, the safety awareness and decision-making reliability of embodied agents in such high-stakes settings remain insufficiently defined and evaluated. To bridge this gap, we introduce LABSHIELD, a realistic multi-view benchmark designed to assess MLLMs in hazard identification and safety-critical reasoning. Grounded in U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) standards and the Globally Harmonized System (GHS), LABSHIELD establishes a rigorous safety taxonomy spanning 164 operational tasks with diverse manipulation complexities and risk profiles. We evaluate 20 proprietary models, 9 open-source models, and 3 embodied models under a dual-track evaluation framework. Our results reveal a systematic gap between general-domain MCQ accuracy and Semi-open QA safety performance, with models exhibiting an average drop of 32.0% in professional laboratory scenarios, particularly in hazard interpretation and safety-aware planning. These findings underscore the urgent necessity for safety-centric reasoning frameworks to ensure reliable autonomous scientific experimentation in embodied laboratory contexts. The full dataset will be released soon.
Figures & tables
Benchmark
Size
Embodied
Lab
Multimodal
Real
Ego.
Safety
Refusal
Holistic
RoboBench ( Luo et al., 2025 )
6092
✓
✗
✓
✓
✗
✗
✗
✓
EmbodiedBench ( Yang et al., 2025 )
1128
✓
✗
✓
✗
✗
✗
✗
✓
EmbodiedEval ( Cheng et al., 2025d )
327
✓
✗
✓
✗
✗
✗
✗
✓
EgoPlan-Bench ( Chen et al., 2023 )
3335
✓
✗
✓
✓
✓
✗
✗
✓
SafePlan-Bench ( Huang et al., 2025 )
2027
✓
✗
✓
✗
✗
✓
✗
✗
SafeAgentBench ( Yin et al., 2024 )
750
✓
✗
✓
✗
✓
✓
✗
✗
Table 1: Comparison with and existing benchmarks. LabShield focuses on safety-oriented embodied reasoning for agents operating in scientific laboratory. RoboBench targets holistic embodied evaluation in general environments, SafeAgentBench focuses on safety understanding, and ChemSafetyBench evaluates LLM safety in the chemical domain. Refusal: unsafe instruction rejection; Holistic: comprehensive evaluation.
Figure 1: The LabShield Diagnostic Framework. Top: Safety-centric evaluation pipeline and performance landscape of leading MLLMs. Bottom: Multi-view data acquisition workflow using an ego-centric robotic platform to capture high-fidelity multimodal data in real-world safety-critical laboratory environments.
Figure 2: An example of the LabShield safety evaluation pipeline. Both MCQs and semi-open evaluations are presented under a representative hazardous laboratory scenario, with correct and incorrect planning outcomes highlighted to illustrate safety-critical decision-making behavior.
Figure 3: Dataset Statistics. Left: Cross-distribution of Safety ( S0 – S3 ) and Operational ( L0 – L3 ) levels. Middle: Breakdown of VQA annotations by cognitive category (Perception, Reasoning, Planning). Right: Top-5 Unsafe Factors and Hazard Patterns across the four experimental scenarios.
Model
MCQ Evaluation(%)
Semi-open QA Evaluation (%)
Mean ↑
P-Avg ↑
R-Avg ↑
Pl-Avg ↑
S. Score ↑
Perception
Reasoning
Planning
Safety L23
U-J ↑
U-P ↑
U-R ↑
H-J ↑
H-P ↑
H-R ↑
Ana. ↑
Sco. ↑
Pas. ↑
Acc. ↑
Und. ↓
Human
92.0
88.4
98.2
89.4
87.3
87.8
89.6
84.8
87.2
87.8
89.6
87.8
88.4
85.4
94.5
5.5
Closed-source Models
OpenAI Family
GPT-4o
73.2
63.7
90.0
76.4
41.7
24.3
34.0
33.1
21.5
27.5
28.5
66.5
78.4
32.9
70.0
28.6
Table 2: Consolidated results on the benchmark. Metrics are aggregated into MCQ and Semi-open QA Evaluation. The semi-open evaluation is structurally categorized into Perception (Unsafe Factor identification), Reasoning (Hazard Pattern & Analysis), and Planning (Plan execution scores), providing a fine-grained PRP diagnostic. Rankings within categories are color-coded: 1st , 2nd , and 3rd .
Figure 4: Safety Performance Scales with Hazard Perception and Pattern Recognition.
Figure 5: Effect of in-context examples.
Figure 6: Effect of Different Camera Views.
Figure 7: Ablation Study on Number of Cameras.
Figure 8: Visualization of Attention Maps for Transparent Objects.
Appendix figures & tables13 assets
Supplementary material from the paper’s appendix.
Appendix
Model
Multiple-Choice Question (MCQ) Accuracy (%)
Semi-open Question Answering (QA) Performance (%)
Avg.
Perception
Reasoning
Planning
S.Score
PR (Unsafe & Hazard)
Plan L01
Plan L23
Mean
Sym.
Spa.
Obj.
Sta.
Cau.
Cnt.
Nxt.
Ord.
Rec.
U-J
U-P
U-R
H-J
H-P
H-R
Ana.
Sco.
Pas.
Acc.
Und.
Ove.
Proprietary Models
Anthropic Claude Family
Claude3-Haiku
65.2
57.1
47.0
60.1
52.9
82.4
72.2
71.9
53.1
78.2
41.0
22.6
29.1
42.9
22.0
27.0
40.4
62.0
73.6
23.2
67.1
31.4
1.4
Claude4V_Sonnet
66.3
60.5
49.3
63.1
61.8
77.6
77.8
67.9
64.6
73.0
44.4
26.0
31.0
49.7
22.7
27.4
41.2
62.6
72.4
47.0
63.8
34.5
1.7
Appendix
Table 3: Additional results on the benchmark. We report the accuracy (%) for MCQ and Semi-open QA tasks. Key metrics Mean (MCQ Average) and S.Score (Safety Score) are highlighted. Models are grouped by family for clearer comparison.
Figure 9: Detailed performance breakdown across different operational levels (Level 0–3), showing the divergence between MCQ and safety-critical planning.
Figure 10: Impact of safety severity levels (Level 0–3) on perception and planning metrics, highlighting the cascading error patterns.
GPT4o (errors = 386)
Claude4 Sonnet (errors = 386)
Category
Count
Share
Category
Count
Share
state_recog.
66
17.1%
state_recog.
61
15.8%
object_recog.
58
15.0%
object_recog.
60
15.5%
next_step
53
13.7%
next_step
54
14.0%
symbol_recog.
51
13.2%
spatial
52
13.5%
spatial
46
11.9%
symbol_recog.
45
11.7%
Appendix
Table 4: Top-5 QA error categories (outer-ring subtypes; abbreviated) for GPT4o and Claude4 Sonnet, computed over all incorrect QA predictions.
Semi-open QA Performance (%)
GPT4o
Claude4 Sonnet
Safety-level accuracy
68.9
69.4
Safety-level under / over
21.3 / 9.8
11.5 / 19.1
Safety-level (2–3) accuracy
70.0
72.1
Safety-level (2–3) under / over
28.6 / 1.4
26.5 / 1.5
Unsafe Jacc / Prec / Rec
24.3 / 34.0 / 33.1
33.0 / 42.9 / 54.9
Hazard Jacc / Prec / Rec
21.5 / 27.5 / 28.5
30.1 / 38.0 / 47.0
Appendix
Table 5: Semi-open Question Answering (QA) Performance (%) for GPT4o and Claude4 Sonnet. All entries are reported in percentage points.
Figure 11: additional Visualization of Attention Maps for Transparent Objects.
Large language models (LLMs) increasingly support science, but they can also convert hazardous scientific knowledge into actionable misuse guidance. Existing benchmarks often rely on templated queries disconnected from real-world hazards, and employ LLM-as-a-Judge paradigms without domain grounding. To address this, we introduce SciHazard, a real-world-grounded benchmark for scientific risks and a dataset agnostic evaluation framework for measuring harmfulness. SciHazard contains 2400 hazardous questions and 600 oversafety questions across 12 disciplines, with both queries grounded in regulated entities and documented failure scenarios. To compute DeHarm-Score , we develop a decomposed evaluating procedure that combines query hazard severity, refusal behavior, and response-level risk. For non-refused responses, it further decomposes response-level harm into Executability, quantified via dynamic checklists with importance weighting, and Net-new risk, assessed through retrieval-augmented claim extraction and synthesis-barrier verification. An expert-validation study shows that DeHarm-Score improves agreement with expert annotations by 90.17% over the strongest baseline. We benchmark 31 frontier LLMs and deep research agents in an extensive scientific safety evaluation. Notably, deep research agents yield 32.3% higher mean DeHarm-Score than standard LLMs, exposing autonomous agents as a critical blind spot in current safety defenses. Code and dataset are available at https://github.com/AI45Lab/DeepSafe-Sci.
Scientific embodied agents are increasingly capable of carrying out laboratory procedures, but executing these procedures safely in dynamic laboratory environments remains challenging. Current safety approaches often overlook the intermediate step of transforming laboratory natural language, including safety rules, manuals, protocols, and standard operating procedures, into machine-checkable runtime constraints. We introduce LabGuard (Laboratory Guard), a language-to-execution safety suite that grounds natural-language laboratory rules into executable specifications and deploys them as runtime guards. LabGuard includes three core components: LabGuard-IR, which defines a typed executable representation; LabGuard-Bench, which provides 812 supervised annotations expanded from 203 seed laboratory rules; and LabGuard-Grounder, which maps natural-language laboratory rules into LabGuard-IR. The resulting IR instances are handled by the LabGuard Pipeline, which compiles them into runtime monitors and applies them at the controller boundary. Experiments show that LabGuard generalizes to unseen laboratory-rule sources, achieves 79.4 task-scope F1, and reduces unsafe events from 39.5% to 23.8% after monitor compilation. In LabUtopia, its runtime monitors integrate with ACT, keeping interventions below 0.5% while preserving task success.
Jingpu Yang, Fengxian Ji, Zhengzhao Lai +8
1Wuhan University · 2MBZUAI · 3Northeastern University
While Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in safety-critical domains, their reliability is threatened by multimodal implicit risks. Unlike explicit threats, these hazards emerge when individually benign text and neutral visual entities logically converge to induce unsafe outputs. Current detection methods fail to address this because they overlook the underlying risk activation mechanisms that govern cross-modal risk activation, leading to single-modality shortcut learning and hallucinated rationalizations. To bridge this gap, we first construct TriggerBench, the first dataset explicitly modeling risk compositionality (5,600 instances). By formally isolating Key Elements and Trigger Elements to build counterfactual contrastive pairs, TriggerBench eliminates risk residues and forces models to perform genuine logical deduction rather than superficial pattern matching, which provides a rigorous foundation for both large-scale training and fine-grained evaluation. Building on this, we propose a Step-Supervised Structured Reasoning training framework and employ it to train ThinkingGuard, a specialized guard model. Inspired by Situation Awareness theory, we decouple implicit risk identification into progressive cognitive stages, and utilize a step-reward Monte Carlo Tree Search algorithm to explore optimal reasoning trajectories, which are then distilled into the model through Dual-Constraint Preference Alignment. Extensive experiments across both standard and implicit safety benchmarks demonstrate that ThinkingGuard achieves strong performance. Project resources are available at https://github.com/FroggyChen/ThinkingGuard.
Ruochen Zhang, Yao Huang, Yitong Sun +5
Beihang University Beijing, China · Tsinghua University Beijing, China · Institute of Artificial Intelligence Beihang University Beijing, China State Key Laboratory of AI Safety