cs.CYFeb 20, 2026

Agentic AI, Retrieval-Augmented Generation, and the Institutional Turn: Legal Architectures and Financial Governance in the Age of Distributional AGI

Authors: Marcel Osmond

Organizations: QMUL CCLS, London, UK.

Abstract

The proliferation of agentic artificial intelligence systems--characterized by autonomous goal-seeking, tool use, and multi-agent coordination--presents unprecedented challenges to existing legal and financial regulatory frameworks. While traditional AI governance has focused on model-level alignment through training-time interventions such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), the deployment of large language models (LLMs) as persistent agents necessitates a paradigm shift toward institutional governance structures. This paper examines the intersection of agentic AI, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), and their implications for legal accountability and financial market integrity. Through analysis of the Institutional AI framework, we argue that alignment must be reconceptualized as a mechanism design problem involving runtime governance graphs, sanction functions, and observable behavioral constraints rather than internalized constitutional values[...].The analysis concludes that the future of AI governance lies not in perfecting isolated model behavior, but in architecting institutional environments where compliant behavior emerges as the dominant strategy through carefully calibrated payoff landscapes.

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