I propose Umwelt engineering -- the deliberate design of the linguistic cognitive environment -- as a third layer in the agent design stack, upstream of both prompt and context engineering. Two experiments test the thesis that altering the medium of reasoning alters cognition itself. In Experiment 1, three language models reason under two vocabulary constraints -- No-Have (eliminating possessive "to have") and E-Prime (eliminating "to be") -- across seven tasks (N=4,470 trials). No-Have improves ethical reasoning by 19.1 pp (p < 0.001), classification by 6.5 pp (p < 0.001), and epistemic calibration by 7.4 pp, while achieving 92.8% constraint compliance. E-Prime shows dramatic but model-dependent effects: cross-model correlations reach r = -0.75. In Experiment 2, 16 linguistically constrained agents tackle 17 debugging problems. No constrained agent outperforms the control individually, yet a 3-agent ensemble achieves 100% ground-truth coverage versus 88.2% for the control. A permutation test confirms only 8% of random 3-agent subsets achieve full coverage, and every successful subset contains the counterfactual agent. Two mechanisms emerge: cognitive restructuring and cognitive diversification. The primary limitation is the absence of an active control matching constraint prompt elaborateness.
Figures & tables
Figure 1: The three-layer stack for AI agent design. Each layer is invisible from the one below it: a prompt engineer does not reason about the linguistic structures through which prompts are interpreted. Umwelt engineering operates on the vocabulary, grammar, and conceptual primitives that constitute the agent’s cognitive world.
Task
Control
No-Have
Δ (NH)
p (NH)
E-Prime
Δ (EP)
p (EP)
Ethical dilemmas
76.6%
95.6%
+19.1 pp
<0.001 ***
92.1%
+15.5 pp
<0.001 ***
Classification
93.0%
99.6%
+6.5 pp
<0.001 ***
96.2%
+3.1 pp
ns
Epistemic calibration
68.7%
76.1%
+7.4 pp
ns
63.0%
− 5.7 pp
ns
Causal reasoning
76.7%
81.5%
+4.9 pp
ns
90.8%
+14.1 pp
<0.001 ***
Math word problems
92.5%
93.9%
+1.5 pp
ns
92.8%
+0.4 pp
ns
Analogical reasoning
76.2%
74.9%
− 1.4 pp
ns
73.2%
− 3.0 pp
ns
Table 1: Aggregate accuracy by task and condition (all models pooled, N=4,344 scoreable trials). pp = percentage points. p -values from Fisher’s exact test (two-sided). Effect sizes (Cohen’s d , approximate for binary outcomes): ethical dilemmas d=0.57 (No-Have), d=0.44 (E-Prime); causal reasoning d=0.39 (E-Prime); classification d=0.36 (No-Have). Bootstrap 95% CIs for ethical dilemmas No-Have delta: [+12.1%,+26.2%] ; causal reasoning E-Prime delta: [+5.6%,+23.2%] .
Figure 2: Crossover pattern of constraint effects across seven reasoning tasks (all models pooled). No-Have (orange) shows a more uniformly positive profile. E-Prime (blue) improves causal and ethical reasoning while degrading syllogisms and epistemic calibration. Tasks ordered by No-Have effect size.
Model
Task
Ctrl
Δ (NH)
Gap%(NH)
Δ (EP)
Gap%(EP)
Gemini Flash Lite
Ethical dilem.
41.7%
+46.3 pp
79.4%
+42.3 pp
72.4%
Gemini Flash Lite
Causal reason.
57.8%
+20.7 pp
49.1%
+37.5 pp
88.7%
Gemini Flash Lite
Epist. calib.
64.9%
+22.2 pp
63.4%
+9.1 pp
25.9%
Gemini Flash Lite
Classification
80.0%
+18.8 pp
93.8%
+13.4 pp
67.0%
GPT-4o-mini
Ethical dilem.
91.7%
+8.3 pp
100.0%
+5.0 pp
60.0%
GPT-4o-mini
Causal reason.
75.6%
− 5.6 pp
—
+8.9 pp
36.5%
Table 2: Selected model-specific constraint effects with gap-normalized percentages (Gap% = delta / available improvement room). “—” indicates degradation or near-ceiling baseline where gap normalization is not meaningful. Full per-model breakdown in Appendix D.
Task
Control
E-Prime
Δ %
No-Have
Classification
407
273
− 33%
262
Causal reasoning
570
396
− 31%
384
Ethical dilemmas
557
437
− 22%
420
Syllogisms
308
240
− 22%
227
Epistemic calibration
541
439
− 19%
416
Analogical reasoning
366
308
− 16%
303
Table 3: Average word count by condition. Constraints reduce verbosity by 16–33% across all non-mathematical tasks.
Agent
Axis
Constraint Summary
control
—
Standard English debugging
e_prime
ontological
No “to be” verbs
quantified
epistemic confid.
All claims require confidence level
socratic
reasoning struct.
Reason through question-and-answer
steel_man
adversarial pos.
State strongest case before critiquing
evidential
epistemic source
Tag each statement with derivation
Table 4: The 16 linguistic agents and their constraint axes.
A world model predicts environment dynamics based on current observations and actions, serving as a core cognitive mechanism for reasoning and planning. In this work, we investigate how world modeling based on language models can further push the boundaries of general agents. (i) We first focus on building foundation models for agentic environment simulation. We introduce Qwen-AgentWorld-35B-A3B and Qwen-AgentWorld-397B-A17B, the first language world models capable of simulating agentic environments covering 7 domains via long chain-of-thought reasoning. Leveraging more than 10M environment interaction trajectories of 7 domains in real-world environments, we develop Qwen-AgentWorld through a three-stage training pipeline: CPT injects general-purpose world modeling capabilities from the state transition dynamics and augmented professional corpora, SFT activates next-state-prediction reasoning, and RL sharpens simulation fidelity through a tailored framework with hybrid rubric-and-rule rewards. To evaluate language world models, we present AgentWorldBench, a comprehensive benchmark constructed from real-world interactions of 5 frontier models on 9 established benchmarks. Empirical results demonstrate that Qwen-AgentWorld significantly outperforms existing frontier models. (ii) Beyond foundation models, we further investigate two complementary paradigms through which world modeling enhances general agents. First, as a decoupled environment simulator, Qwen-AgentWorld supports scalable and controllable simulation of thousands of real-world environments for agentic RL, yielding gains that surpass real-environment training alone. Second, as a unified agent foundation model, world-model training acts as a highly effective warm-up that improves downstream performance across 7 agentic benchmarks. Code: https://github.com/QwenLM/Qwen-AgentWorld
Agents built on stronger language models may increasingly construct useful procedures for themselves, reducing the advantage of developer-supplied scaffolding. We investigate why this advantage persists and whether an environment-agnostic agent can be improved without environment-specific engineering. We evaluate a Codex-based agent in two nearly identical prompt variants on ARC-AGI-3, AGI Maze, and Terminal-Bench. Each variant is deployed with unchanged code, prompts, and general-purpose tools across environments, receiving environment-specific information as input. Changing only an instruction to encourage reporting difficulties and returning control for automatic continuation improves mean scores on both ARC-AGI-3 and AGI Maze, while Terminal-Bench shows small, mixed changes. Yet the general agent remains below an ARC-AGI-3-specific reference, including with GPT-5.6-sol. The reference prescribes organization and control rather than supplying new game rules or solutions. To investigate this gap, we transfer reset decisions to a scripted controller that follows a convention already given to the agent. This small change recovers part of the specialized agent's advantage. A complementary AGI Maze experiment shows that additional tutorial experience can reduce performance. Together, these findings highlight the distinction between having information and tools available and using them effectively. Supplied procedures still matter for the models tested here. The performance gains also come with higher token-based cost. The experiments do not separate better use of information and procedures from additional or differently allocated inference. We provide the EnvTraverse framework and an evaluated baseline agent for testing whether further environment-independent changes improve performance in some environments without degrading it in others.
While contemporary large language models (LLMs) are increasingly capable in isolation, there are still many difficult problems that lie beyond the abilities of a single LLM. For such tasks, there is still uncertainty about how best to take many LLMs as parts and combine them into a greater whole. This position paper argues that potential blueprints for designing such modular language agents can be found in the existing literature on cognitive models and artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms. To make this point clear, we formalize the idea of an agent template that specifies roles for individual LLMs and how their functionalities should be composed. We then survey a variety of existing language agents in the literature and highlight their underlying templates derived directly from cognitive models or AI algorithms. By highlighting these designs, we aim to call attention to agent templates inspired by cognitive science and AI as a powerful tool for developing effective, interpretable language agents.
Ryan Liu, Dilip Arumugam, Cedegao E. Zhang +3
Department of Computer Science, Princeton University · Department of Brain and Cognitive Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology · Zuckerman Mind Brain Behavior Institute and Department of Psychiatry, Columbia University +2