Are they human? Detecting large language models by probing human memory constraints

An essential problem in artificial intelligence is whether LLMs can simulate human cognition or merely imitate surface-level behaviors, while existing datasets suffer from either synthetic reasoning traces or population-level aggregation, failing to capture authentic individual cognitive patterns. We introduce a benchmark grounded in the longitudinal research trajectories of 217 researchers across diverse domains of artificial intelligence, where each author's scientific publications serve as an externalized representation of their cognitive processes. To distinguish whether LLMs transfer cognitive patterns or merely imitate behaviors, our benchmark deliberately employs a cross-domain, temporal-shift generalization setting. A multidimensional cognitive alignment metric is further proposed to assess individual-level cognitive consistency. Through systematic evaluation of state-of-the-art LLMs and various enhancement techniques, we provide a first-stage empirical study on the questions: (1) How well do current LLMs simulate human cognition? and (2) How far can existing techniques enhance these capabilities?

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used to simulate human responses in behavioral research, yet it remains unclear when LLM-generated data support the same experimental inferences as human data. We evaluate this by directly comparing off-the-shelf LLM-generated responses with human responses from a canonical survey experiment on accuracy perception. Each human observation is converted into a structured prompt, and models generate a single 0--10 outcome variable without task-specific training; identical statistical analyses are applied to human and synthetic responses. We find that LLMs reproduce several directional effects observed in humans, but effect magnitudes and moderation patterns vary across models. Off-the-shelf LLMs therefore capture aggregate belief-updating patterns under controlled conditions but do not consistently match human-scale effects, clarifying when LLM-generated data can function as behavioral surrogates.

Mentalization - the ability to infer others' beliefs and intentions to guide one's own choices - is a key cognitive function underlying human social interactions. Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate behaviour consistent with humans on theory-of-mind tasks, yet whether these models can guide adaptive behaviour through mentalization is unknown. Here we use two economic games with cognitive computational modeling to uncover the latent strategies underlying mentalization in LLMs. We tested individual LLM agents across four model families, DeepSeek, GPT-4.1, GPT-5 and Gemini 2.0 Flash (N = 2,099), against opponents of varying sophistication and examined whether a prompting strategy designed to elicit strategic reasoning improved performance. We benchmarked results against human participants (N = 251) as a comparative measure. Across both games, LLMs showed clear behavioural and computational signatures of mentalizing that differed markedly by model provider and size. Strategic prompting generally improved performance by inducing more sophisticated reasoning, yet the extent of the benefit differed across the two tasks. Last, GPT-5 agents flexibly adapted their recursive depth of reasoning to increasingly sophisticated opponents, demonstrating superior performance to human participants. Collectively, we demonstrate different capacities for mentalization across LLMs, and highlight cognitive computational modeling as a formal method for assessing comparative intelligence across humans and machines.