Artificial Intelligence and Systemic Risk: A Unified Model of Performative Prediction, Algorithmic Herding, and Cognitive Dependency in Financial Markets

We show that AI-driven investment strategies are inherently self-defeating at scale. As AI adoption rises, three mutually reinforcing channels -- signal crowding, performative signal erosion, and Red Queen competition -- compress excess returns. We derive the alpha half-life $h(φ) = \ln 2/[θ+ δ(φ)]$, where $θ$ is the natural mean-reversion rate and $δ(φ) = Nφρa/λ(φ)$ is the AI-accelerated decay component, which is convex-decreasing in adoption. At current adoption levels ($φ\approx 0.7$, $ρ\approx 0.6$), the model implies signal half-lives of 18 months versus 5-7 years pre-AI. We establish four theoretical results. First, the alpha half-life theorem: signal lifespans are convex-decreasing in AI adoption. Second, a signal extinction cascade: beyond a critical threshold $φ^*$, the decay of one signal class triggers accelerated competition for remaining signals. Third, a Red Queen impossibility: in the monoculture equilibrium, net alpha is identically zero despite heavy AI investment. Fourth, a fragility-efficiency tradeoff: the adoption level maximizing price discovery strictly exceeds the level minimizing systemic fragility. Empirical validation calibrates portfolio convergence to SEC Form 13F filing patterns (99.5 million holdings, 2013-2024), documenting that simulated institutional portfolio convergence increases by 42% over the sample period. We examine simulated hedge fund return dynamics showing declining cross-sectional dispersion among AI-adopting funds, and simulate the 2010 Flash Crash to illustrate fragility consequences.

We develop a formal theory of cognitive debt: the stock of unverified reasoning obligations that accumulates when individuals use AI as a substitute rather than a complement for first-principles cognition. The model features two state variables per agent, cognitive capital and cognitive debt, and a multiplicative production technology in which cognitive capital functions as collateral that determines the return to AI adoption. We establish six propositions. Rational agents incur positive cognitive debt because the costs are deferred, partially external, and masked by short-run productivity gains. Tranquil periods lower subjective risk assessments, raise AI substitution intensity, and compound leverage, generating a cognitive Minsky moment in which subjective risk falls while true systemic fragility rises. Expected crisis losses are convex in aggregate leverage. Post-crisis, output-target pressure can produce a false-correction loop in which agents patch AI failures with more AI. The decentralised equilibrium over-adopts substitutive AI relative to the social optimum because of systemic risk, cognitive public goods, and arms-race externalities. In a two-type heterogeneous-agent economy, high-cognitive-capital agents adopt AI more intensively and may eventually erode their unaided cognitive capital below that of initially lower-skilled agents.

This paper investigates how similarity in the informational representation of market states among Artificial Intelligence (AI) trading agents can generate systemic instability in financial markets. We construct a structural multi-agent market model calibrated using high-frequency microstructural moments. AI agents are modeled through a two-layer decision architecture consisting of a nonlinear representation layer and an adaptive linear readout layer. The representation layer maps raw market states into high-dimensional feature vectors, while the readout layer generates return forecasts that feed into a risk-controlled trading rule. This representation-based microfoundation separates two objects that are often conflated in the literature: representation homogeneity (the degree to which agents encode market states into similar feature spaces) and forecast overlap (the degree to which agents produce similar return predictions). We show theoretically that these two concepts are related but not equivalent, and that representation homogeneity can compress the effective space of forecast disagreement under stress even when predictions appear diverse in normal times. Through controlled factorial experiments that vary representation homogeneity while conditioning on alternative risk-aversion and learning-rate distributions, we hypothesize that increasing representation similarity amplifies synchronization in beliefs and positions, leading to volatility clustering, liquidity stress, and elevated tail risk. Our structural mechanisms suggest that low perceived volatility regimes can endogenously accumulate hidden leverage through position stickiness, which subsequently collapses when shocks trigger synchronized deleveraging. The results provide a structural foundation for macroprudential policies aimed at monitoring and preserving diversity in how AI systems represent and process market information.