Beyond Pessimism: Offline Learning in KL-regularized Games
Organizations: University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign. · California Institute of Technology.
Abstract
We study offline learning in KL-regularized two-player zero-sum games, where policies are optimized with respect to a fixed reference policy through KL regularization. Prior work relies on pessimistic value estimation to handle distribution shift, yielding only statistical rates. We develop a new pessimism-free algorithm and analytical framework for KL-regularized games, built on the smoothness of KL-regularized best responses and a stability property of the Nash equilibrium induced by skew symmetry. This yields, to our knowledge, the first pessimism-free offline learning guarantee for KL-regularized games, with a fast sample complexity bound. We further propose an efficient self-play policy optimization algorithm that replaces exact equilibrium computation with iterative KL-regularized policy updates, and prove that its last iterate preserves the same pessimism-free statistical guarantee up to a controlled optimization error.
Figures & tables
KL-Regularized RL
Kullback–Leibler-regularized reinforcement learning uses divergence penalties to balance reward-seeking policy updates with staying near a reference policy.
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