Pessimism-Free Offline Learning in General-Sum Games via KL Regularization

We study the problem of learning Nash equilibria in offline two-player zero-sum Markov games. While existing approaches often rely on explicit pessimism to address distribution shift, we show that KL regularization alone suffices to stabilize learning and guarantee convergence. We first introduce Regularized Offline Sequential Equilibrium (ROSE), a theoretical framework that achieves a fast $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/n)$ convergence rate under \textit{unilateral concentrability}, improving over the standard $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/\sqrt{n})$ rates in unregularized settings. We then propose Sequential Offline Self-play Mirror Descent (SOS-MD), a practical model-free algorithm based on least-squares value estimation and iterative self-play updates. We prove that the last iterate of SOS-MD attains the same $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/n)$ statistical rate up to a vanishing optimization error of order $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(1/\sqrt{T})$ in the number of self-play iterations $T$.

Offline learning of strategies takes data efficiency to its extreme by restricting algorithms to a fixed dataset of state-action trajectories. We consider the problem in a mixed-motive multiagent setting, where the goal is to solve a game under the offline learning constraint. We first frame this problem in terms of selecting among candidate equilibria. Since datasets may inform only a small fraction of game dynamics, it is generally infeasible in offline game-solving to even verify a proposed solution is a true equilibrium. Therefore, we consider the relative probability of low regret (i.e., closeness to equilibrium) across candidates based on the information available. Specifically, we extend Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO), an online game-solving approach, by quantifying game dynamics uncertainty and modifying the RL objective to skew towards solutions more likely to have low regret in the true game. We further propose a novel meta-strategy solver, tailored for the offline setting, to guide strategy exploration in PSRO. Our incorporation of Conservatism principles from Offline reinforcement learning approaches for strategy Exploration gives our approach its name: COffeE-PSRO. Experiments demonstrate COffeE-PSRO's ability to extract lower-regret solutions than state-of-the-art offline approaches and reveal relationships between algorithmic components empirical game fidelity, and overall performance.

\emph{Kullback-Leibler} (KL) regularization is ubiquitous in reinforcement learning algorithms in the form of \emph{reverse} or \emph{forward} KL. Recent studies have demonstrated $ε^{-1}$-type fast rates for decision making under reverse KL regularization, in contrast to the standard $ε^{-2}$-type sample complexity. However, for forward-KL-regularized objectives, existing statistical analyses are either not applicable or result in $\tilde{O}(ε^{-2})$ slow rates. We take the first step towards addressing this problem via a streamlined analysis of forward-KL-regularized offline CBs. We give the first $\tilde{O}(ε^{-1})$ upper bounds in tabular and general function approximation settings, both under notions of \emph{single-policy concentrability}. In particular, our convex-analytical pipeline unifies these settings by exploiting the pessimism principle in a novel way and completely bypasses the proof routines in previous works based on the mean value theorem, which might be of independent interest. Moreover, we provide rate-optimal lower bounds, manifesting the tightness of our upper bounds in terms of statistical rates. Our lower bounds also demonstrate that the forward-KL-regularized sample complexity recovers the unregularized slow rate in the low-regularization regime, similarly to the reverse-KL regularization.