Coalition Formation in LLM Agent Networks: Stability Analysis and Convergence Guarantees

Large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed in competitive multi-agent settings, raising fundamental questions about whether they converge to equilibria and how their strategic behavior can be characterized. In this paper, we study LLM agent interactions in two standard games: a network resource allocation game and a Cournot competition game. Rather than converging to Nash equilibria, we find that LLM agents tend to cooperate when given multi-round prompts and non-zero-sum context. Chain-of-thought analysis reveals that fairness reasoning is central to this behavior. We propose an analytical framework that captures the dynamics of LLM agent reasoning across rounds and explains these experimental findings.

The shift from monolithic LLMs to distributed multi-agent architectures demands new frameworks for verifying and securing autonomous coordination. Unlike traditional multi-agent systems focused on cooperative state alignment, modern LLM patterns: multi-agent debate, constitutional oversight, helper-critic loops-rely on adversarial critique for error correction and reasoning refinement. Since LLMs are dynamical systems whose latent states are imperfectly observable from verbalized outputs, securing these networks requires understanding both macroscopic topology and microscopic agent observability. This paper establishes a rigorous graph-theoretic framework for analyzing consensus in signed, directed interaction networks, bridging graph theory and LLM reasoning by formally mapping Transformer cross-entropy log-odds to the signed Laplacian. We characterize agreement stability through structural balance theory, showing how unbalanced critique cycles produce logical frustration and persistent reasoning oscillations, and prove that unobservable latent states from hidden system prompts act as topological Trojan horses that destabilize cooperative consensus. To resolve unobservable deadlocks, we restrict interaction topologies to chordal graphs and apply matrix decomposition with Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization, proving that rank-one spectral edge perturbations deterministically break expertise symmetry by shifting eigenvalues into the stable left-half plane. Core contributions include consensus theorems, polynomial-time Perfect Elimination Ordering verification algorithms, and large-scale empirical validation on clustered ensembles of LLaMA-3, Mistral, and Gemma agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in multi-agent environments that produce unanimous agreement, both in intended interactions that need coordination and in unintended emergent interactions. Consequently, understanding how LLMs with competing incentives reach consensus is crucial to better interpret and design LLM collectives. We introduce an evaluation, based on the Network Consensus game, to assess the mechanisms driving this process. Here, a network of agents must agree on one of two colours to receive a payoff, but agents are offered different payoffs for the agreed colour. We vary components such as communication access and network structure and assess six open-source models and one closed model (ChatGPT 5.6-sol). We find that open-source LLMs reach consensus less often than humans in comparable experiments and only if messages are communicated across the global network. ChatGPT 5.6-sol, however, is able to reach consensus with communication limited to its neighbours and with no communication ability. This is achieved through lower stubbornness and higher majority-following tendencies, and by providing more information about its neighbours' states in messages. However, situating agents in a highly clustered graph reduces consensus, regardless of these traits, demonstrating that both system design and individual model traits drive collective outcomes.