CBCL: Safe Self-Extending Agent Communication

This paper introduces language-based agent control (LBAC), a new programming model for agentic applications that brings techniques from programming languages and language-based security to the problem of agent control. In conventional programming, combinations of static typing and runtime enforcement have long been used to guarantee that well-typed programs satisfy user-specified policies, including policies for access control, information flow, data provenance, and more. The key idea behind LBAC is to extend these guarantees to agentic applications by requiring agents to generate programs that are themselves well typed in the context of the surrounding scaffolding code. Unsafe programs are rejected by the type-checker before execution, allowing policies to apply uniformly across the entire application, including both agent-generated behavior and developer-written scaffolding. At the same time, LBAC preserves substantial expressiveness: agents may perform arbitrary side-effect-free computation and recursively invoke subagents, which retain full tool access subject to the same -- or potentially more restrictive -- policies. We demonstrate LBAC with three case studies: I/O sandboxing via filesystem capabilities, data provenance, and information-flow control.

This position paper argues that enforcing LLM agent safety within a single abstraction layer is not merely suboptimal but categorically insufficient for deployed LLM agents -- a structural consequence of how agent execution works, not a contingent limitation of current systems. The three dimensions that jointly constitute safe operation -- semantic intent and policy compliance, environmental validity, and dynamical feasibility -- each depend on a strictly distinct set of information that becomes available at different stages of execution. No single guardrail can certify all three. We argue that the community must respond with a contract-based architecture in which each safety dimension is enforced by an independently certified layer whose probabilistic guarantee satisfies the next layer's assumption. We sketch such an architecture and derive the compositional system-level safety bounds it admits via the chain rule of probability. Three open problems stand between this and a deployable standard: bound estimation from non-i.i.d.\ traces, graceful degradation of contracts under deployment drift, and extension to multi-agent settings -- the most important unfinished business in LLM agent runtime assurance.

LLM agents increasingly act by writing code, yet a split persists between the runtime that drives the agent and the code the model writes. The runtime owns the loop, context, and control flow, and the model has little say over any of them. Letting model-written code shape the runtime itself would make agents more expressive, but it would also sharpen safety problems. A model can be diverted by a prompt injection, call the wrong tool, or fail partway and leave an inconsistent state, and each such failure reaches further when the code shapes the runtime than when it expresses a single action. We present LACUNA, a programming model for agents that closes this split while preserving safety. Each agent action is a typed call $\texttt{agent[T](task)}$ that the LLM fills with code when execution reaches it, and the code is type-checked against the surrounding program before it runs. Because each action is accepted or rejected as a whole, a rejected one leaves the environment untouched, and its compiler diagnostics drive a retry. The same check also bounds which tools and data an action may use and how they flow. Our primitive expresses ReAct loops, sub-agents, skills, parallel decomposition, and multi-model planning as ordinary control flow. We evaluate LACUNA on a collection of test cases, BrowseComp-Plus, and $τ^2$-bench. On BrowseComp-Plus, $8.6\%$ of generations are rejected before execution, with 0.7 retries per query on average, and the agent reaches $27.1\%$ accuracy. On $τ^2$-bench, LACUNA solves $76.0\%$ of $392$ tasks across four domains with a capable model, on par with the baseline agent.