RISC-V Functional Safety for Autonomous Automotive Systems: An Analytical Framework and Research Roadmap for ML-Assisted Certification

Aggregate metrics may not fully reflect performance in insufficiently examined high-risk driving conditions. We propose RISC (Risk-Informed Slice Coverage), a practical protocol for risk-guided stress testing and coverage-qualified evaluation. Risk-guided stress testing directs a finite audit budget toward risk-relevant sub-datasets, called risk slices, while coverage-qualified evaluation reports results together with explicit statements about which slices are sufficiently or insufficiently covered. The protocol translates safety concerns into machine-readable risk slices, uses lightweight signals to tag candidate data, selects a compact audit set by risk, and qualifies the results using coverage evidence. An LLM can optionally support this process by surfacing relevant but potentially overlooked conditions during test planning, thereby helping engineers not to forget the obvious. RISC is model-agnostic and can be applied to perception modules, driving models, and other autonomous-driving subsystems. We instantiate the protocol for monocular pedestrian perception using 1,000 frames from the Zenseact Open Dataset, image statistics, and a YOLO-based detector proxy. In this proof-of-concept study, risk-guided selection increases critical failure discovery from 34.0% under random sampling to 98.5%. RISC provides a lightweight, assurance-oriented evaluation layer that complements scenario categorization, coverage assessment, and broader testing-and-verification workflows.

The design of embedded safety-critical systems such as those used in next-generation automotive and autonomous platforms, is increasingly challenged by escalating system complexity, hardware-software heterogeneity, and the integration of intelligent, data-driven components. Ensuring dependability in such systems requires a holistic approach that spans multiple abstraction layers and encompasses both design- and run-time assurance. Traditional methods for reliability, safety, and security management often fall short in addressing the dynamic and uncertain behaviors introduced by Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML) components, especially under stringent real-time, power, and safety constraints. While AI and ML offer powerful predictive, adaptive, and self-optimizing capabilities that can enhance system dependability, their inherent non-determinism, data-dependence, and lack of formal guarantees introduce new challenges for verification, validation, and certification. This paper explores emerging methodologies, architectures, and frameworks for designing dependable autonomous and embedded systems in the era of AI. It highlight advances in reliability modeling, secure system design, and certification approaches that account for imperfect, learning-enabled components, aiming to bridge the gap between AI innovation and certifiable system-level dependability.

The ISO 26262 standard defines functional safety for road vehicles through risk assessments based on Severity, Exposure, and Controllability, grounded in a human-driven vehicle paradigm. In the context of autonomous vehicles (AVs), the absence of a human driver necessitates revisiting these principles. This paper decomposes the Controllability placeholder into two auditable evidence dimensions of ISO 26262 by introducing two measurable sub-concepts: Transferability and Predictability. Transferability extends Controllability to capture AV systems' ability to hand off control to dedicated fallback safety mechanisms, while Predictability captures how easily external agents can anticipate AV behavior. Predictability is formally defined from human-robot interaction-inspired principles, and a mathematical framework is provided to quantify it. A designed-versus-achievable gap is introduced to distinguish architectural fallback claims from scene-conditioned achievable fallback capability. The proposed metrics align with ISO 26262 and ISO/PAS 21448 (SOTIF), rendering fallback and interaction claims falsifiable and traceable across ODD slices. These dimensions complement rather than replace existing standards, and the enhancements preserve the structure of ISO 26262 while extending its applicability to driverless automated systems operating at SAE Levels 4 and 5.