Safety alignment in large language models is remarkably shallow: it is concentrated in the first few output tokens and reversible by fine-tuning on as few as 100 adversarial examples. This fragility becomes critical in real-world deployment, where models undergo sequential adaptation across domains such as medicine, law, and code, causing safety guardrails to erode cumulatively. Yet all existing safety-preserving methods target only single-task fine-tuning, leaving the multi-domain sequential setting entirely unaddressed. We introduce SafeAnchor, a framework that anchors safety in place throughout continual adaptation. SafeAnchor first identifies low-rank safety subspaces in LoRA parameter space via Fisher Information eigendecomposition, then constrains domain-specific gradient updates to the orthogonal complement of these subspaces, and finally monitors for residual safety drift with threshold-triggered corrective replay. Evaluated on Llama-2-7B-Chat and Mistral-7B-Instruct across a three-domain pipeline and eight benchmarks, SafeAnchor retains 93.2% of original safety alignment, outperforming all baselines by 18-42 points, while matching unconstrained fine-tuning to within 1.5 points on domain tasks.
Large language models require continuous adaptation to new tasks while preserving safety alignment. However, fine-tuning on even benign data often compromises safety behaviors, including refusal of harmful requests, truthfulness, and commonsense reasoning. We investigate which training samples cause alignment drift through a data-centric lens. Our empirical analysis shows samples contribute unequally: high-gradient samples cause greater safety degradation and drive models toward pretrained distributions, while moderate-gradient samples enable task learning with minimal alignment loss. We propose gradient-based sample selection that filters high-gradient samples during fine-tuning. Across multiple model families on continual domain tasks, our method substantially improves alignment preservation while maintaining competitive task performance, without requiring curated safe data or architectural modifications. Our method is robust across selection ratios, task orderings, and diverse attack benchmarks.
Fine-tuning well-aligned large language models (LLMs) on new domains often degrades their safety alignment, even when using benign datasets. Existing safety alignment techniques primarily focus on pretraining, leaving fine-tuned models vulnerable to behavioral shifts. In this work, we introduce safety token regularization (STR), a lightweight method designed to preserve safety properties during fine-tuning. Our approach identifies salient tokens from rejection templates of well-aligned models and constrains their associated logits during training, preventing the loss of critical safety behaviors. Unlike reinforcement learning or preference optimization methods, STR requires minimal additional computation and seamlessly integrates with parameter-efficient fine-tuning techniques such as LoRA. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves safety performance on par with state-of-the-art methods, while preserving task-specific utility and requiring minimal implementation overhead. Furthermore, we show that safety token regularization enhances training stability and overall performance beyond safety considerations alone. This work offers a practical and readily deployable strategy for continual safety alignment in fine-tuned LLMs.
Domain fine-tuning degrades the safety of large language models: fine-tuned specialists readily comply with harmful prompts framed in domain language. Existing inference-time defenses that mix logits from a safe anchor model require both models to share a vocabulary, which rules them out for the cross-family specialists where safety is most degraded. We present ALIGNBEAM, a training-free method that lifts this restriction by translating anchor logits into the target model's vocabulary token-by-token at each decoding step; a small LLM judge then selects the safest among K candidate continuations. No weights are changed, and the safety-utility trade-off can be tuned at deployment without retraining. Across both cross-vocabulary and same-vocabulary evaluation pairs, ALIGNBEAM substantially raises refusal on adversarial benchmarks while keeping task accuracy and inference overhead within practical bounds. The results show that safety alignment can be transferred between model families at inference time, without touching either model's weights.