Adversarial Arena: Crowdsourcing Data Generation through Interactive Competition

Ensuring the safety of large language models (LLMs) requires robust red teaming, yet the systematic synthesis of high-quality toxic data remains under-explored. We propose Reverse Constitutional AI (R-CAI), a framework for automated and controllable adversarial data generation that moves beyond isolated jailbreak prompts. By inverting a harmless constitution into a constitution of toxicity and iteratively refining model outputs through a critique--revision pipeline, R-CAI enables scalable synthesis of multi-dimensional adversarial data without human annotation. Optimizing solely for toxicity-related rewards, however, can lead to reward hacking and degraded semantic coherence. To address this challenge, we introduce probability clamping within reinforcement learning from AI feedback, which stabilizes adversarial optimization while preserving adversarial intent. Experiments demonstrate that R-CAI generates diverse, high-quality toxic data and that probability clamping substantially improves semantic coherence (15%) without sacrificing adversarial strength. Overall, R-CAI provides a fully automated framework for red teaming data generation and systematic safety evaluation of aligned language models.

Small language models (SLMs) are attractive for agentic deployment due to low latency, reduced cost, and on-device privacy, yet they struggle with tool-use tasks where training data is scarce and noisy. Unlike larger models, SLMs cannot compensate for low-quality supervision through sheer capacity, making data quality the critical bottleneck. We present Data Turnstile, an open-source framework that takes user-defined API specifications and generates high-quality synthetic training data for function calling. Turnstile decomposes multi-turn tool-use interactions into constrained, stepwise generation with validation and error-feedback loops, providing fine-grained control over API diversity, conversation complexity, and output correctness. We demonstrate effectiveness of domain adaptation with Turnstile data on two challenging function calling benchmarks. On the BFCL single-turn benchmark, a Qwen3-0.6B fine-tuned on Turnstile data without chain-of-thought achieves 75.9% overall accuracy (versus 67.4% for the base model with thinking enabled), closing the gap with thinking-enabled Qwen3-1.7B (78.4%) and Qwen3-4B (79.9%) despite being 3$\times$ and 7$\times$ smaller respectively. On $τ^2$-bench, a multi-turn agentic benchmark, Turnstile-trained Qwen3-1.7B achieves 31.1% pass^1 on the Telecom domain, improving 4.7$\times$ over its 6.6% base and surpassing Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct (27.4%), a model 19$\times$ larger. Turnstile-trained Qwen3-0.6B achieves 24.6%, improving 7$\times$ over its 3.5% base and approaching the 32B model (53$\times$ larger). We release Data Turnstile along with a dataset spanning 1,000+ APIs and 100K+ multi-turn interactions.

We present MultiBreak, a scalable and diverse multi-turn jailbreak benchmark to evaluate large language model (LLM) safety. Multi-turn jailbreaks mimic natural conversational settings, making them easier to bypass safety-aligned LLM than single-turn jailbreaks. Existing multi-turn benchmarks are limited in size or rely heavily on templates, which restrict their diversity. To address this gap, we unify a wide range of harmful jailbreak intents, and introduce an active learning pipeline for expanding high-quality multi-turn adversarial prompts, where a generator is iteratively fine-tuned to produce stronger attack candidates, guided by uncertainty-based refinement. Our MultiBreak includes 10,389 multi-turn adversarial prompts, spans 2,665 distinct harmful intents, and covers the most diverse set of topics to date. Empirical evaluation shows that our benchmark achieves up to a 54.0 and 34.6 higher attack success rate (ASR)} than the second-best dataset on DeepSeek-R1-7B and GPT-4.1-mini, respectively. More importantly, safety evaluations suggest that diverse attack categories uncover fine-grained LLM vulnerabilities}, and categories that appear benign under single-turn can exhibit substantially higher adversarial effectiveness in multi-turn scenarios. These findings highlight persistent vulnerabilities of LLMs under realistic adversarial settings and establish MultiBreak as a scalable resource for advancing LLM safety.