Six Llamas: Comparative Religious Ethics Through LoRA-Adapted Language Models
Authors: Chad Coleman, W. Russell Neuman, Manan Shah, Ali Dasdan, Matthew Crispi, Morris Chiang, Zack Leitman, Mustafa Poonawala
Abstract
We present Six Llamas, a comparative study examining whether large language models fine-tuned on distinct religious corpora encode systematically different patterns of ethical reasoning. Six variants of Meta-Llama-3.1-8B are constructed: one unmodified control and five LoRA-adapted models trained exclusively on the sacred and theological texts of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, or Buddhism. All six models are probed with an identical battery of 17 standardized ethical prompts spanning moral dilemmas, game-theoretic scenarios, public policy questions, and moral-psychological self-assessments. To assess robustness and reproducibility, we implement a multi-temperature sampling design spanning ten temperature settings. We compute response consistency metrics, pairwise inter-model agreement rates, temperature sensitivity coefficients across four prompt domains, and run-to-run stability analyses. Findings show that LoRA-adapted models produce ethical reasoning patterns that are (a) systematically differentiated from the base model, (b) consistent with the moral logics of their training traditions, (c) structured along interpretable dimensions in moral-philosophical space, (d) core ethical positions remain stable across temperature variations for high-consensus dilemmas. The Trolley Problem achieves 100% consistency across all models and temperatures, while (e) tradition-specific divergence intensifies at higher temperatures in morally contested domains, and (f) the base model exhibits the highest overall response consistency (mean 88.3%), suggesting LoRA adaptation introduces both tradition-specific signal and increased sampling sensitivity. The study offers a proof-of-concept for the condensate comparative method using differentially trained language models as instruments for cultural and ethical analysis and identifies specific criteria for falsification and planned extensions.
We evaluate whether enabling provider-exposed reasoning mode changes moral judgments within the same model checkpoint. Across 100 moral-judgment scenarios and five frontier reasoning-trained LLMs (Claude Sonnet 4.6, GPT 5.5, Gemini 3 Flash, DeepSeek V3.1, and Qwen3.5 397B), aggregate binary-verdict agreement remains high and statistically indistinguishable between instant and thinking modes (Krippendorff's alpha = 0.78 vs. 0.79). However, disagreement is concentrated in 21 model-disputed scenarios, where instant-mode agreement is near chance (alpha = 0.08). On these scenarios, reasoning directionally narrows cross-model disagreement, increasing mean pairwise agreement from 5.4 to 6.7 out of 10. Reasoning also reduces demographic-judgment inconsistency in three of five models and does not increase it for any model. Across all five model families, reasoning changes self-labeled ethical frameworks more often than binary verdicts.
Behavioral audits of Large Language Models on moral prompts measure what the model says, not the internal computation producing it. We use Transluce, an AI-driven mechanistic-interpretability platform, to examine LLaMA 3.1-8B-Instruct on 54 moral prompts in four batteries: 17 dilemmas, policy, and meta-ethical questions (B1); 6 role-playing scenarios (B3); and a controlled trolley contrast varying the switching mechanism with people fixed (B4, 15 prompts) or identity attributes with mechanism fixed (B5, 16 prompts). Two complementary metric families, five cluster-level metrics and a six-metric neuron-level panel, converge on a Situational Anchor Effect: domain-specific representations dominate the top of the activation list across every battery. The model's ethics-labeled capacity stays essentially constant; its salience (rank, priority, top-of-list presence) is highly sensitive to the interpretive frame the prompt selects. The B4-vs-B5 contrast confirms the model attends to whichever surface feature varies: aggregate ethics metrics are indistinguishable, but the dominant non-ethics distractor mirrors the design. A multi-temperature audit identifies a candidate ethics neuron (L16/N3837) stable across temperatures; a cross-model behavioral proxy on two frontier models yields preliminary evidence of divergence in self-reported moral focus, consistent with an Alignment Wrapper in which RLHF re-orders surface text without removing underlying domain-first frames. We unify these as Frame-Conditioned Moral Computation: the prompt's surface vocabulary selects a feature manifold, and the moral conclusion is downstream of that selection. Behavioral alignment must be supplemented by Mechanistic Alignment: a research program asking whether ethics-related features can be shown causally privileged under controlled frame variation, not merely loud in the explanation.
Large language models (LLMs) exhibit systematic differences in moral reasoning across languages, yet the source of this variation remains unclear. We test the hypothesis that languages encode aspects of the institutional environments in which they are spoken, allowing LLMs to inherit institution-specific moral priors through training. Across nine languages spanning a broad gradient of institutional quality, six frontier LLMs, and two preregistered studies, we examine moral dilemmas whose acceptability depends on institutional functioning. In Study 1, explicit institutional framing produced uniformly null results: cross-linguistic moral divergence did not increase in institutionally contingent scenarios, nor did it track institutional differences between language communities. In Study 2, we introduced institutionally ambiguous scenarios in which institutional stakes were present but not explicitly stated. Under these conditions, cross-linguistic moral divergence increased relative to institutionally inert controls and, with one theoretically informative exception, was associated with real-world institutional differences between language communities. Explicit framing again attenuated these effects. These findings suggest that institutional experience may leave detectable traces in language that shape LLM moral reasoning, while also indicating that explicit institutional cues can suppress the expression of those differences.