Do Large Language Models Encode Institutional Experience? Evidence from Cross-Linguistic Moral Reasoning Under Ambiguity

We present Six Llamas, a comparative study examining whether large language models fine-tuned on distinct religious corpora encode systematically different patterns of ethical reasoning. Six variants of Meta-Llama-3.1-8B are constructed: one unmodified control and five LoRA-adapted models trained exclusively on the sacred and theological texts of Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, or Buddhism. All six models are probed with an identical battery of 17 standardized ethical prompts spanning moral dilemmas, game-theoretic scenarios, public policy questions, and moral-psychological self-assessments. To assess robustness and reproducibility, we implement a multi-temperature sampling design spanning ten temperature settings. We compute response consistency metrics, pairwise inter-model agreement rates, temperature sensitivity coefficients across four prompt domains, and run-to-run stability analyses. Findings show that LoRA-adapted models produce ethical reasoning patterns that are (a) systematically differentiated from the base model, (b) consistent with the moral logics of their training traditions, (c) structured along interpretable dimensions in moral-philosophical space, (d) core ethical positions remain stable across temperature variations for high-consensus dilemmas. The Trolley Problem achieves 100% consistency across all models and temperatures, while (e) tradition-specific divergence intensifies at higher temperatures in morally contested domains, and (f) the base model exhibits the highest overall response consistency (mean 88.3%), suggesting LoRA adaptation introduces both tradition-specific signal and increased sampling sensitivity. The study offers a proof-of-concept for the condensate comparative method using differentially trained language models as instruments for cultural and ethical analysis and identifies specific criteria for falsification and planned extensions.

Large language models have been extensively studied for emotion recognition and moral reasoning as distinct capabilities, yet the extent to which emotions influence moral judgment remains underexplored. In this work, we develop an emotion-induction pipeline that infuses emotion into moral situations and evaluate shifts in moral acceptability across multiple datasets and LLMs. We observe a directional pattern: positive emotions increase moral acceptability and negative emotions decrease it, with effects strong enough to reverse binary moral judgments in up to 20% of cases, and with susceptibility scaling inversely with model capability. Our analysis further reveals that specific emotions can sometimes behave contrary to what their valence would predict (e.g., remorse paradoxically increases acceptability). A complementary human annotation study shows humans do not exhibit these systematic shifts, indicating an alignment gap in current LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly issue judgments read as binary verdicts, and a growing literature reports such judgments shifting under logically irrelevant changes of wording - among them an amplified yes-no bias on moral dilemmas, absent in humans. A single framing cannot say what such a shift is: in a yes/no question the word "no" is at once logical verdict, lexical token, and last-printed option. We introduce a psychometric battery that separates these: crossed symmetrization - every logically irrelevant factor flipped in balanced pairs - across a corpus of question forms. A graded rating across logically equivalent forms recovers a coherent internal moral scale: frontier models' stance $θ$ is nearly format-invariant (cross-form incoherence 0.12-0.21 on a $\pm 1$ axis); small open-weight models fail in model-specific ways. Forcing the verdict through yes/no overlays a decomposable artifact: an order bias toward the last-printed option - opposite to classic human primacy - plus a lexical pull toward the word "no"; the artifact is substantial only in the Claude models (story-averaged -0.32 to -0.86), $\approx 0$ for GPT-5.5 and Gemini, and shrinks under extended reasoning. The word and the verdict share one token; swapping the words for arbitrary labels separates them, and the verdict-attached logical bias proves $\approx 0$ for every frontier model, while model-specific label and order attachments remain: the models are not drawn toward rejecting - the pull follows the printed surface, not the verdict it carries. A minimal model, $P = σ((θ\pm m)/s)$, summarizes any such artifact by a framing susceptibility m and a moral decisiveness s, measurably distinct from sampling temperature. The battery applies unchanged to any dilemma set and binary format: measuring what a model values requires crossing the frames of the question, not asking once.