This paper examines the strategic use of language in contemporary artificial intelligence (AI) discourse, focusing on the widespread adoption of metaphorical or colloquial terms like "hallucination", "chain-of-thought", "introspection", "language model", "alignment", and "agent". We argue that many such terms exhibit strategic polysemy: they sustain multiple interpretations simultaneously, combining narrow technical definitions with broader anthropomorphic or common-sense associations. In contemporary AI research and deployment contexts, this semantic flexibility produces significant institutional and discursive effects, shaping how AI systems are understood by researchers, policymakers, funders, and the public. To analyse this phenomenon, we introduce the concept of glosslighting: the practice of using technically redefined terms to evoke intuitive -- often anthropomorphic or misleading -- associations while preserving plausible deniability through restricted technical definitions. Glosslighting enables actors to benefit from the persuasive force of familiar language while maintaining the ability to retreat to narrower definitions when challenged. We argue that this practice contributes to AI hype cycles, facilitates the mobilisation of investment and institutional support, and influences public and policy perceptions of AI systems, while often deflecting epistemic and ethical scrutiny. By examining the linguistic dynamics of glosslighting and strategic polysemy, the paper highlights how language itself functions as a sociotechnical mechanism shaping the development and governance of AI.
The vocabulary used to describe AI agents in governance contexts -- learning, memory, values, compliance, identity, trust -- is borrowed from psychological and organizational science, contributing to systematic failures in how organizations deploy, oversee, and hold agents accountable. This paper argues that the problem is not merely terminological but epistemological: psychological vocabulary carries an "invisible grammar" of its home discipline into governance discourse, calibrating frameworks to a metaphysical entity that does not exist in current AI architectures. We call this the disciplinary language transfer problem. Drawing on Wittgenstein's concept of language games, Kuhn's paradigm-laden observation, Haraway's situated knowledge, and Star and Griesemer's boundary object theory, we show that the transfer operates at three levels (epistemological assumptions, theoretical constructs, and surface vocabulary), each requiring a different remediation. We characterize six foundational epistemological assumptions embedded in Western psychological governance discourse, trace their origin in specific philosophical traditions, and show why each fails when applied to systems without developmental continuity. The paper's practical output is an actionable Disciplinary Audit: a six-question governance document scan operationalized through a translation taxonomy of thirty-seven terms mapping operational constructs to agent-appropriate replacements, presented here in abridged form and openly archived in full. The vocabulary reform proposed here is not merely terminological; it is the condition of possibility for governance frameworks that correctly identify what they are governing.
Kymberly Lasser-Chere, Tyler Akidau, Marc Millstone
Public discourse on AI has become polarized; exaggerated positions on AI in traditional and social media threaten the development of AI Literacy among the general public. In this article, I introduce the VET Framework, a method for categorizing AI discourse along the dimensions of valence, effectiveness, and trajectory. I show how this framework can be used to identify, compare, and critique prevalent narratives of AI Hype, AI Doom, AI Denial, and AI Normalcy. Using VET, I analyze how each of these four stances exaggerates some aspects of the current state and/or likely evolution of AI, and illustrate how the VET framework can serve as an AI Literacy tool by supporting the ``vetting'' of polarized AI discourse.
Public discourse about artificial intelligence (AI) often uses anthropomorphic language: language that attributes human capabilities and characteristics to the system. This practice has been criticized for setting misleading expectations, inflating claims, and fueling hype around AI, which may distort public understanding of AI and impact policy priorities. We study the effects of anthropomorphic framing by comparing changes in participants' perceptions (N=815) when reading passages with and without anthropomorphic language, designed to reflect realistic public-facing AI discourse. We further examine whether these effects differ across two types of AI technologies -- large language models and recommendation systems -- and measure changes in perceptions of AI across several dimensions that are prominent in current public discourse. In a separate condition using a text that explicitly discusses the dangers of AI, we show that individuals' views of AI can shift in response to reading a text; yet in the main conditions of the experiment, where we compare anthropomorphic and non-anthropomorphic descriptions, we find that whether the text uses anthropomorphic language does not substantially affect participants' perceptions of AI. Our results indicate that any immediate effects on public opinions of AI are modest, although they leave open the possibility that anthropomorphic language could have an effect in naturalistic settings, or over gradual, continued exposure.