GSAR: Typed Grounding for Hallucination Detection and Recovery in Multi-Agent LLMs

Before letting an agent operate over real context, can you prove it used the right evidence? GroundEval turns that question into a deterministic test of what the agent searched, fetched, cited, and was permitted to access. In one case study, two frontier LLM judges scored a plausible agent response 0.85 and higher. But the trace told a different story: the agent had never retrieved the artifact its answer depended on, yielding a GroundEval score of 0.000. We introduce GroundEval, a judge-free framework for evaluating agents against grounded, time-bounded, and access-controlled evidence. GroundEval uses a domain configuration to generate questions, lets the agent choose how to answer, and then scores both the final answer and the recorded trajectory that produced it. The benchmark targets three failures that LLM-as-judge evaluation struggles to detect: whether an agent checked before claiming absence, reasoned only from evidence available to the actor at the relevant time, and used the correct causal mechanism rather than a plausible one. These correspond to three tracks: Silence, Perspective, and Counterfactual. GroundEval exposes when plausible answers rest on invalid evidence paths, and produces structured per-question diagnostics that pair tool activity with the agent's turn-level narration, making each score inspectable rather than merely reported. Our case studies suggest this failure mode is common rather than exceptional, one that final-answer and judge-based evaluation cannot detect by construction.

Large language model (LLM) judges are increasingly organized as multi-agent panels under the assumption that exchanging critiques improves judgment quality. We test this assumption for \emph{groundedness verification}, where a judge must determine whether a claim is supported by the supplied evidence. We evaluate a homogeneous three-agent panel on six public fact-verification and hallucination-detection benchmarks. Relative to a fixed single-agent reference, the panel's system-level accuracy difference ranges from $+8.5$ to $-4.4$ percentage points: two datasets show reliable gains, one shows a reliable loss, and three are statistically inconclusive. Because the reference and panel use different model variants, these differences characterize the complete systems rather than isolate a causal debate effect.

When copies of the same language model are prompted to debate, they produce diverse phrasings of one perspective rather than diverse perspectives. Multi-agent debate (MAD), and more broadly closed-system reasoning where agents iteratively transform each other's outputs, tends to preserve answer accuracy while degrading the reasoning behind those answers. We name the multi-agent case the Debate Trap and the broader phenomenon the Reasoning Trap, offering a programmatic theory of evidence-grounded reasoning failure.The framework has three parts: (i) SFS (Supported Faithfulness Score), a claim-level metric verifying decomposed atomic claims against provided evidence (decomposer-invariant rankings: Spearman rho=1.0); (ii) EGSR (Evidence-Grounded Socratic Reasoning), replacing adversarial argumentation with evidence-grounded inquiry; (iii) Theorem 1 (DPI Bound): under standard MAD, the chain E -> O^0 -> O^1 -> ... is Markov, and the Data Processing Inequality implies E[I(E;O^{t+1})] <= E[I(E;O^t)]. Three companion results -- open-system recovery (Theorem 2), EGSR accumulation (Lemma 2), and vote-aggregation floor (Proposition 1) -- partition multi-step LLM reasoning by its information-theoretic relationship to E. Across 16 conditions on SciFact (300 claims) and FEVER (1,000 claims), DebateCV (C13) preserves 88% of baseline accuracy while SFS drops 43%; majority-vote MAD (C15) reduces SFS to 1.7% of baseline (p < 10^{-6}, d = -0.96); EGSR recovers 98%. An R6 cohort study (Korean n=10x30 FEVER; English n=3x200 SciFact) finds inter-rater Fleiss kappa <= +0.018 with 0.8-1.4 Likert intra-rater shifts across language and domain -- the human agreement that faithfulness metrics have been calibrated against is not itself stable. We offer one falsifiable conjecture: any closed-system reasoning protocol preserving Theorem 1's Markov structure is, in expectation, subject to the same DPI bound.