Organizations: Department of Automation, Tsinghua University · State Key Laboratory of General Artificial Intelligence · Institute for Artificial Intelligence, Peking University · School of Psychological and Cognitive Sciences, Peking University · Beijing Key Laboratory of Behavior and Mental Health, Peking University
Extracting abstract causal structures and applying them to novel situations is a hallmark of human intelligence. While Large Language Models (LLMs) and Vision Language Models (VLMs) have shown strong performance on a wide range of reasoning tasks, their capacity for interactive causal learning -- inducing latent structures through sequential exploration and transferring them across contexts -- remains uncharacterized. Human learners accomplish such transfer after minimal exposure, whereas classical Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents fail catastrophically. Whether state-of-the-art Artificial Intelligence (AI) models possess human-like mechanisms for abstract causal structure transfer is an open question. Using the OpenLock paradigm requiring sequential discovery of Common Cause (CC) and Common Effect (CE) structures, here we show that models exhibit fundamentally delayed or absent transfer: even successful models require initial environmental-specific mapping -- what we term environmental grounding -- before efficiency gains emerge, whereas humans leverage prior structural knowledge from the very first solution attempt. In the text-only condition, models matched or exceeded human discovery efficiency. In contrast, visual information -- in both the image-only and text-and-image conditions -- overall degraded rather than enhanced performance, revealing a broad reliance on symbolic processing rather than integrated multimodal reasoning. Models further exhibited systematic CC/CE asymmetries absent in humans, suggesting heuristic biases rather than direction-neutral causal abstraction. These findings reveal that large-scale statistical learning does not produce the decontextualized causal schemas underpinning human analogical reasoning, establishing grounding-dependent transfer as a fundamental limitation of current LLMs and VLMs.
When large language models (LLMs) fail to generalize or make haphazard errors in reasoning, it is often taken as evidence that LLMs are not truly reasoning, but rather performing a kind of pattern matching. The implication is that people's behavior does not exhibit the same types of failures because human reasoning uses principled and abstract world models. We evaluate human participants and 25 LLMs on their ability to engage in common-sense reasoning about a variety of everyday situations and observe similar patterns of errors in both people and models. We then identify the set of attention heads driving LLM responses and find that these heads implement a form of pattern-matching. These attention heads allow us to predict seemingly inexplicable reasoning errors in people caused by ostensibly irrelevant prompt details. Taken together, our results suggest that everyday causal reasoning in people and LLMs is more consistent with a form of pattern-matching than with abstract world models.
A long-standing finding in the causal learning literature is that adults struggle to identify conjunctive causal rules, where an effect requires the simultaneous presence of multiple causes, while performing better in disjunctive settings. However, most demonstrations of this conjunctive handicap'' rely on passive observation paradigms with limited evidence, where learners have no control over evidence generation. This paper asks whether this bias persists when adults are granted agency through active exploration. Using a modified blicket detector'' task, adult participants freely intervened to identify causal objects under conjunctive or disjunctive rule structures. We show that active exploration substantially improves adults' conjunctive causal reasoning, although conjunctive rules still require more tests to infer than disjunctive rules. We further compare human performance to a range of large language models in the same setting. While some state-of-the-art models approach human-level performance on hypothesis inference accuracy, they often exhibit less efficient exploration strategies and similar conjunctive-disjunctive performance gaps.
We introduce CausaLab, a scalable environment for evaluating interactive causal discovery by LLM agents. Unlike prior evaluations, CausaLab evaluates both whether an agent can solve a problem using causal evidence and whether its answer is grounded in a faithful recovered causal mechanism. Each episode places an agent in a synthetic laboratory: it receives prior measurement records, intervenes on a manipulator crystal, and predicts the resonance frequency of a held-out reactor crystal governed by the same mechanism. The hidden data-generating process is a randomly sampled structural causal model (SCM), so success requires recovering both a causal graph and structural equations rather than recalling prior knowledge. Experiments show a persistent gap between prediction and mechanism recovery: in the purely observational 6-node setting, GPT-5.2-high reaches 92% task accuracy but only 0.471 all-edge F1. Mixed observation-intervention strategies improve structural fidelity, while pure intervention remains difficult even for strong agents. We identify premature stopping as a major weakness and show that consistency verification mitigates it. CausaLab therefore separates predictive success from causal understanding and exposes current LLM agents' limits as experimental causal reasoners.