LLMs Should Not Yet Be Credited with Decision Explanation

Large language models (LLMs) have the potential to aid and improve human decision-making in classification tasks, not only by providing fairly accurate predictions, but also in their ability to generate cogent narrative explanations of those predictions. Prior work has demonstrated that people generally find AI narrative explanations to be understandable, trustworthy, and convincing for changing beliefs and opinions; however, less is known about the impact of narrative explanations on objective human decision-making performance. Here we conduct a large-scale human behavioral experiment to evaluate decision-making performance with LLM-generated narrative explanations of varying persuasiveness. We found the degree of persuasiveness, or lack thereof, for LLM-based explanations did not meaningfully impact decision accuracy over a simple AI prediction alone, in agreement with typical results with explainable AI based on feature importance. We found evidence that narratives increased reliance on AI, but both when the AI prediction was correct and incorrect. Exploratory analyses also indicated that the more persuasive narratives may have had a detrimental effect on decision response times and the ability to discriminate between a correct and incorrect AI prediction. Overall, this work indicates that including narrative explanations with AI predictions may involve tradeoffs for decision-making performance, and more work is needed to determine how and when narrative explanations impact human decision-making.

LLM decision components that can operate within agent workflows often produce action-relevant recommendations or judgements together with explanations. Operators may use the named factors to monitor a system, diagnose errors, or decide when to escalate an output. Such use assumes that the explanations agree with the component's observable decision behaviour. We test two interpretations of the named factors: necessity, meaning that changing a factor would change the output, and sufficiency, meaning that retaining it while removing other changeable information would preserve the output. We evaluate these interpretations in two synthetic use cases: recommending advisors to clients and judging prompts for harmfulness or risk. Models return an output and the top three factors that most influenced it. Controlled black-box interventions estimate a necessity score for each factor by measuring how often changing it changes the output, and a sufficiency score by measuring how often retaining it preserves the output. Across eight models from the Claude, GPT, and Gemini families, the mean Spearman correlations between the cited ranking and the necessity and sufficiency scores are 0.349 and 0.354 for advisor recommendation, and 0.431 and 0.580 for prompt monitoring. Furthermore, an uncited factor scores above the lowest-scoring cited factor in 57.6% of advisor responses under necessity and 58.1% under sufficiency; the corresponding prompt-monitoring rates are 25.8% and 8.9%. The cited top three contain useful information but do not reliably identify the three factors with the strongest measured influence under necessity or sufficiency. The framework provides a black-box reliability check for explanations used in agent oversight while remaining scoped to individual LLM decisions.

We ask whether large language models (LLMs) merely imitate rationales when choosing between two options, or whether their choices reflect a systematic underlying decision structure. Using synthetic binary decision settings in which models choose between profiles defined by graded attributes, we compare the attribute a model says mattered most with the attribute that best explains its choice under a behavioural model fit to prior decisions. The behavioural model predicts held-out choices well, showing that model behaviour is systematically related to the visible attributes rather than being random. However, direct self-reports and a separate score-based judge recover the behaviourally inferred driver only partially. The resulting picture is neither one of arbitrary behaviour nor one of fully articulated belief - outputs are structured enough to support prediction, but explicit reasons track the recovered driver only imperfectly. This qualitative pattern persists across prompt-order and sampling perturbations, alternative behavioural models, targeted occlusion analyses, and structurally varied decision settings. We interpret this as evidence for ``superficial belief'' in LLM decision-making: models behave as if guided by probabilistic local priorities over attributes, while having only limited verbal access to the attributes that drive their decisions.