Are we Doomed to an AI Race? Why Self-Interest Could Drive Countries Towards a Moratorium on Superintelligence

AI sovereignty is the extent to which a nation independently controls its artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. The race toward ever-more-sophisticated frontier AI models is of increasing strategic importance, with nations considering how AI might improve their economic situations, competitive advantage, and overall national power. However, the costs of AI sovereignty are enormous, and we lack definitions and conceptual models to navigate evolving AI sovereignty dynamics. We address this gap with definitions relevant to AI sovereignty, along with a first-of-its-kind qualitative model that incorporates micro, meso, and macro contributors. Model-based qualitative forecasts highlight competitive dynamics and evolving potential for AI-driven national power. The model identifies key leverage points that nations can use to enhance their own growth or degrade an adversary's, including consideration of accelerators, electricity, water, data sets and skilled workforce. These leverage points can be activated at strategic and operational levels through both direct kinetic actions, such as Iran's targeting of data centers with drones, and indirect non-kinetic effects including cyber, space, information, economic coercion and diplomacy. If our assumptions and hypotheses are valid, this strategic competition may come to define how nations improve their economic situations, competitive advantage, and overall national power in the 21st Century.

AI's central challenge is shifting from capability to coexistence. The dominant paradigm in AI research focuses on developing powerful agents that treat the world as an exogenous and stationary source of feedback. We contend that superintelligence, an extremely capable task solver, born out of such a solipsistic approach to AI design, is unlikely to be cooperative. Deploying AI systems induces endogenous non-stationarity, resulting in a train-test-deploy gap where historical distributions diverge from the deployment context. We refer to this as the self-undermining property of unilateral optimization. Closing this gap requires AI that participates in cooperation: the equilibrium-selection process through which multiple actors navigate their interdependence. We call for a non-solipsistic research paradigm that treats this interdependence as a core design principle rather than approaching cooperation as a task to solve. This entails building dynamic evaluation testbeds involving adaptive counterparties, treating institutions as design primitives, and preserving human agency as a structural feature of the systems we build.

Technological races create tension between speed and safety: actors may gain by moving faster than competitors, even when risky development is harmful. This is prominent in debates about artificial intelligence (AI), where competitive pressure is often argued to incentivise riskier, less safety-conscious development. We study this using a framed behavioural experiment based on an idealised AI race, in which paired participants repeatedly chose between Safe and Unsafe development under an uncertain time horizon. Unsafe development gave faster progress and higher immediate payoffs but accumulated private risk up to a treatment-specific maximum of 10%, 60%, or 90%; the race's competitive structure was held constant, and only this maximum risk varied. Neither the pre-registered comparison between risk levels nor the role of elicited risk preferences was supported by the data. Instead, exploratory analyses motivated by the task's repeated structure show that Unsafe behaviour is shaped less by risk preferences than by the evolving strategic state of the race: participants are more likely to choose Unsafe after their opponent does so, being ahead reduces Unsafe play while falling behind increases it, and first-round choices predict later behaviour. To interpret these effects we introduce a reduced evolutionary model with four strategies -- Always Safe, Always Unsafe, Conditionally Safe, and Conditionally Antisocial Safe -- which reproduces the treatment effect and shows how conditional Unsafe behaviour can be favoured by competitive race dynamics. Together, the experiment and model show that unsafe development can emerge from early behavioural momentum, opponent behaviour, and fear of falling behind, rather than from risk preferences alone, suggesting policy should focus on reducing competitive pressure and promoting cooperation in AI development rather than only individual risk.