What does it mean to understand the world? Contemporary world models often operationalize understanding as accurate future prediction in latent or observation space. Developmental cognitive science, however, suggests a different view: human understanding emerges through the construction of internal theories of how the world works, even before mature language is acquired. Inspired by this theory-building view of cognition, we introduce Learning-to-Theorize, a learning paradigm for inferring explicit explanatory theories of the world from raw, non-textual observations. We instantiate this paradigm with the Neural Theorizer (NEO), a probabilistic neural model that induces latent programs as a learned Language of Thought and executes them through a shared transition model. In NEO, a theory is represented as an executable, compositional program whose learned primitives can be systematically recombined to explain novel phenomena. Experiments show that this formulation enables explanation-driven generalization, allowing observations to be understood in terms of the programs that generate them.
Representation learning is central to modern machine learning, but most research examines how representations are optimized after a framework has been selected. Less attention is given to when a new representational level becomes necessary. This article introduces the Bootstrap Theory of Representational Emergence (TBER), an initial conceptual theory and research program describing how new representations arise when existing ones become explanatorily insufficient. A representation may remain descriptively useful while failing to make certain observations, relations, transformations, or organizational properties intelligible. TBER treats this explanatory insufficiency as a positive signal for representational transition rather than as simple falsification or prediction error. The proposed recursive process follows five stages: stabilized observation, anomaly detection, recognition of explanatory insufficiency, representational emergence, and provisional stabilization. The framework concerns transitions between scientific or computational representations, not equivalent transitions within the physical systems being observed. Its scope includes representation learning, latent spaces, foundation models, world models, digital twins, adaptive biological systems, and scientific discovery. TBER does not propose a new algorithm, model architecture, benchmark, or optimization procedure. Its contribution is meta-representational: it provides a framework for interpreting when and why new representational levels become necessary. A possible implication for future artificial intelligence is the development of systems able to detect when their own internal representations have reached explanatory limits and to initiate representational refinement or transition.
Young children demonstrate early abilities to understand their physical world, estimating depth, motion, object coherence, interactions, and many other aspects of physical scene understanding. Children are both data-efficient and flexible cognitive systems, creating competence despite extremely limited training data, while generalizing to myriad untrained tasks -- a major challenge even for today's best AI systems. Here we introduce a novel computational hypothesis for these abilities, the Zero-shot World Model (ZWM). ZWM is based on three principles: a sparse temporally-factored predictor that decouples appearance from dynamics; zero-shot estimation through approximate causal inference; and composition of inferences to build more complex abilities. We show that ZWM can be learned from the first-person experience of a single child, rapidly generating competence across multiple physical understanding benchmarks. It also shows progressive, staged emergence of capacities during learning and builds brain-like internal representations. Our work presents a blueprint for efficient and flexible learning from human-scale data, advancing both a computational account of children's early physical understanding and a path toward data-efficient AI systems.
This report of world models distinguishes prior works by the cognitive functions they innovate. Many works claim an almost human-like cognitive capability in their world models. To evaluate these claims requires a proper grounding in first principles from human and machine cognition theory. In moving towards human-like world models we present a conceptual unified framework for world models that fully incorporates all the cognitive functions (i.e., memory, perception, language, reasoning, imagining, motivation, and metacognition) and identify gaps in existing research as a guide for future states of the art. In particular, we find that motivation (especially intrinsic motivation) and metacognition remain drastically under-researched, and we propose concrete directions to address these gaps informed by active inference and global workspace theory. We also introduce epistemic world models, a new category encompassing agent frameworks for scientific discovery that operate over structured knowledge. Our taxonomy, applied to video, embodied, and epistemic world models, suggests research directions where prior taxonomies have not.