Graph-Augmented LLMs for Swiss MP Ideology Prediction

As users increasingly turn to Large Language Models (LLMs) for information and advice on political matters, particularly during election periods, the political preferences expressed by these systems have become a matter of public interest. Prior research has shown that interactions with LLMs can influence users' political attitudes and choices, raising questions about how these models themselves evaluate political actors. In this paper, we investigate whether and how LLMs express preferences toward political parties and political leaders. We introduce a systematic and reproducible auditing framework in which multiple LLMs are prompted to evaluate parties and leaders across nine criteria. Rather than attempting to infer the models' "true" political beliefs, we focus on their observable behavior, examining consistency across evaluations, differences between models, refusal rates, and sensitivity to prompt formulation. We further investigate how these evaluations vary when models are instructed to adopt different personas. We demonstrate the framework through an Italian case study, providing a systematic analysis of LLM-generated political evaluations on italian parties and leaders.

We argue, with systematic empirical evidence, that a large language model's political ideology is not a fixed point, but a conditional distribution $\mathbb{P}($position$\mid$context$)$ over a real political space. We evaluate nine current LLMs using a unified measurement framework anchored by VAA-CHES projection models, which map responses onto three validated dimensions (lrgen, lrecon, galtan) across six contextual axes. Our findings reveal high sensitivity to context: persuasive framing and under-represented languages displace coordinates by up to 0.57 and 0.52 units, respectively, while chain-of-thought reasoning often amplifies rather than dampens paraphrase instability. Despite this local plasticity, the model cohort occupies a remarkably narrow Overton envelope overall, occupying roughly one-third the spread of major European parties. Supported by a multi-trait multi-method (MTMM) analysis, we conclude that a single point cannot summarize LLM political behavior; it must be characterized as a shape. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/sakhadib/LLM-Ideoplasticity.

The formation of political coalitions is a complex negotiation driven by both concrete policy objectives and deep-seated ideological convictions. While Large Language Models (LLMs) open new avenues for computational political science, the neutrality and helpfulness biases instilled by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) prevent them from sustaining steadfast partisan behaviour. We present a multi-agent framework that reconciles factual grounding with ideological alignment by combining Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), Direct Preference Optimization (DPO), and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG): DPO instils aggressive party-specific personas, while a per-party RAG pipeline keeps each agent bounded to its official manifesto. We operationalize the framework on the 2019 Flemish election, deploying the partisan agents in a hub-and-spoke negotiation arbitrated by a formateur. To make the emergent negotiation interpretable, we introduce a Multi-Layered Information Lineage Topology (MILT) that traces every clause in the final agreement back to its manifesto origin and classifies it into five provenance states, a Coalition Influence Score (CIS) that aggregates these traceable contributions to identify which party shaped the agreement, and a real-world grounding pass that benchmarks each simulated provision against the historically adopted coalition agreement. Across three independent simulations the framework yields a stable winner and ranking (N-VA ahead of CD&V and Open Vld), and manifesto-anchored lineage reliably predicts real-world materialization whereas hallucinated content does not. The result is a transparent, scalable testbed for the ex-ante exploration of party compatibility and formateur-mediated compromise.