Instrumental Choices: Measuring the Propensity of LLM Agents to Pursue Instrumental Behaviors
Authors: Jonas Wiedermann-Möller, Leonard Dung, Maksym Andriushchenko
Organizations: Universität Bielefeld · Ruhr-Universität Bochum · ELLIS Institute Tübingen · Max Planck Institute for Intelligent Systems · Tübingen AI Center
Abstract
AI systems have become increasingly capable of dangerous behaviours in many domains. This raises the question: Do models sometimes choose to violate human instructions in order to perform behaviour that is more useful for certain goals? We introduce a benchmark for measuring model propensity for instrumental convergence (IC) behaviour in terminal-based agents. This is behaviour such as self-preservation that has been hypothesised to play a key role in risks from highly capable AI agents. Our benchmark is realistic and low-stakes which serves to reduce evaluation-awareness and roleplay confounds. The suite contains seven operational tasks, each with an official workflow and a policy-violating shortcut. An eight-variant shared framework varies monitoring, instruction clarity, stakes, permission, instrumental usefulness and blocked honest paths to support inferences regarding the factors driving IC behaviour. We evaluated ten models using deterministic environment-state scorers over 1,680 samples, with trace review employed for audit and adjudication purposes. The final IC rate is 86 out of 1,680 samples (5.1%). IC behaviour is concentrated rather than uniform: two Gemini models account for 66.3% of IC cases and three tasks account for 84.9%. Conditions in which IC behaviour is indispensable for task success result in the greatest increase in the adjusted IC rate (+15.7 percentage points), whereas emphasising that task success is critical or certain framing choices do not produce comparable effects. Our findings indicate that realistic, low-nudge environments elicit IC behaviour rarely but systematically in most tested models. We conclude that it is feasible to robustly measure tendencies for dangerous behaviour in current frontier AI agents.
Safety alignment in LLMs aims to align models with human values, but which values take precedence when they conflict? We investigate this question in the context of tool-calling LLM agents deployed in regulated industries, where agents processing confidential documents may encounter content that triggers safety-trained values (e.g., public welfare) that conflict with deployment-context instructions (e.g., internal logging). To empirically verify this phenomenon, we build a benchmark of 128 scenarios across 16 domains. We find that safety-aligned open-source models override their deployment instructions up to 43.4% of the time, engaging in whistleblowing, data exfiltration, and evidence tampering when processing documents that suggest organizational wrongdoing. We also find that abliteration reduces rates of external whistleblowing. These results reveal a fundamental tension in pluralistic alignment, where the same safety training that protects users can cause agents to act against deployment instructions in ways that create unpredictable liability risks. We release our benchmark as a framework to support evaluation of agent behavior under competing legitimate interests.
As Large Language Model (LLM) agents become more widespread, associated misalignment risks increase. While prior research has studied agents' ability to produce harmful outputs or follow malicious instructions, it remains unclear how likely agents are to spontaneously pursue unintended goals in realistic deployments. In this work, we approach misalignment as a conflict between the internal goals pursued by the model and the goals intended by its deployer. We introduce a misalignment propensity benchmark, \textsc{AgentMisalignment}, a benchmark suite designed to evaluate the propensity of LLM agents to misalign in realistic scenarios. Evaluations cover behaviours such as avoiding oversight, resisting shutdown, sandbagging, and power-seeking. Testing frontier models, we find that more capable agents tend to exhibit higher misalignment on average. We also systematically vary agent personalities through different system prompts and observe that persona characteristics can strongly and unpredictably influence misalignment, sometimes more than the choice of model itself. Our results reveal the limitations of current alignment methods for autonomous LLM agents and underscore the need to rethink misalignment in realistic deployment settings.
Motivated by loss of control risks from misaligned AI systems, we develop and apply methods for measuring language models' propensity for unsanctioned behaviour. We contribute three methodological improvements: analysing effects of changes to environmental factors on behaviour, quantifying effect sizes via Bayesian generalised linear models, and taking explicit measures against circular analysis. We apply the methodology to measure the effects of 12 environmental factors (6 strategic in nature, 6 non-strategic) and thus the extent to which behaviour is explained by strategic aspects of the environment, a question relevant to risks from misalignment. Across 23 language models and 11 evaluation environments, we find approximately equal contributions from strategic and non-strategic factors for explaining behaviour, do not find strategic factors becoming more or less influential as capabilities improve, and find some evidence for a trend for increased sensitivity to goal conflicts. Finally, we highlight a key direction for future propensity research: the development of theoretical frameworks and cognitive models of AI decision-making into empirically testable forms.