The rise of machine learning has shifted targeted resource allocation in policy and humanitarian settings toward algorithmic targeting based on predicted risk scores. This approach is typically cheaper and faster than traditional screening procedures that directly observe the latent vulnerability status through physical verification. Yet, even access to the true conditional vulnerability probability cannot eliminate misallocation: aleatoric uncertainty over individual vulnerability status is irreducible, and probabilistic targeting inevitably misallocates some resources. In this work we study how screening and algorithmic targeting should be optimally combined in a two-stage allocation framework where a screening stage observes true outcomes for a subset of units before a final allocation stage assigns the resource under a fixed coverage budget. We show that the optimal strategy screens units at the margin of algorithmic allocation, while directly targeting the highest-risk units. Furthermore, we empirically characterize when screening and algorithmic targeting act as complements or substitutes: efficiency gains from screening grow as the aleatoric uncertainty in the population increases. We illustrate our framework with applications in income-based social protection programs and humanitarian demining in Colombia, where the tension between screening costs and allocation efficiency is operationally consequential.
We study the welfare-maximizing allocation of heterogeneous objects when screening uses costly effort rather than monetary transfers. No-screening mechanisms perform well as object variety increases. In a symmetric continuous market with i.i.d. values whose CDF is log-concave, the multidimensional problem reduces exactly to a single-dimensional problem in agents' best-option values. More options make low best-option values rarer, weakening the case for screening. We characterize when no screening is optimal and show it remains optimal as variety expands. Large-variety limits and numerical results for finite, correlated markets support this pattern. We apply these results to propose an invitation-based vaccine appointment system.
We study a sequential resource allocation problem motivated by adaptive network recruitment, in which a limited budget of identical resources must be allocated over multiple rounds to individuals with stochastic referral capacity. Successful referrals endogenously generate future decision opportunities while allocating additional resources to an individual exhibits diminishing returns. We first show that the single-round allocation problem admits an exact greedy solution based on marginal survival probabilities. In the multi-round setting, the resulting Bellman recursion is intractable due to the stochastic, high-dimensional evolution of the frontier. To address this, we introduce a population-level surrogate value function that depends only on the remaining budget and frontier size. This surrogate enables an exact dynamic program via truncated probability generating functions, yielding a planning algorithm with polynomial complexity in the total budget. We further analyze robustness under model misspecification, proving a multi-round error bound that decomposes into a tight single-round frontier error and a population-level transition error. Finally, we evaluate our method on real-world inspired recruitment scenarios.
Public service programs often allocate limited resources under uncertainty about their benefits, creating a need for randomization to support credible evaluation. In practice, however, applicants commonly enter waitlists where resources are prioritized toward individuals judged to have higher need through tiered priority queues, making direct randomization difficult. Motivated by this, we develop an experimental design framework for learning treatment effects while treating those most in need where incoming applicants are randomized into priority queues based on their assessed risk scores. Treatments are then provided across queues in priority order and first-in-first-out within queue as budget becomes available. Our contributions are two-fold. First, we characterize what causal effects are identified under this priority-queue allocation. When arrivals are exogenous, treatments are conditionally randomized, and hence standard estimands are identified; when arrivals are endogenous, queue randomization instead provides an instrument for treatment, identifying local treatment effects induced by the queuing process. Second, we develop optimized queue-assignment designs that trade off statistical efficiency against prioritizing higher-need applicants. We show in the process that, despite dependence in treatment assignments induced by the design, usual iid efficiency bounds remain well-justified design objectives. We illustrate the proposed designs using data from a housing allocation program in a large U.S. county.